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Construction Disputes: Assessing the Use of
Negligent Misrepresentation to Recover Economic
Loss after Presnell
Steven M. Henderson'
I. INTRODUCTION
THE construction of the modern day marvel requires the exercise of
the technical and creative skill of design professionals' as well as the
expertise of modern day craftsmen who transform an idea embodied in a
set of documents to a tangible product which can be enjoyed by all. This
process, however, does not occur without disagreement among the various
parties and often results in disputes that must be resolved through some
type of dispute resolution system. Accordingly, the construction industry
is one segment of our industrial culture that breeds a tremendous amount
of litigation.
In a traditional construction project,3 an owner contracts with a design
professional to prepare plans and specifications for construction. Addition-
ally, the owner may require the design professional to provide administra-
tive services4 throughout the course of the project, or alternatively, may hire
I J.D. expected 2007, University of Kentucky College of Law; M.S., Civil Engineering,
University of Kentucky, 1999; B.S., Civil Engineering, University of Kentucky, 1997. The au-
thor wishes to thank his wife Emily for her patience, love, and support throughout the process
of preparing this Note.
2 The term "design professional" is used throughout this Note to refer to both archi-
tects and engineers; these professionals are generally treated equally by the legal system.
See Patricia N. Jackson, The Role of Contract in Architectural and Engineering Malpractice, 51 INS.
COUNSEL J. 517,517 n.4 (1984) ("Tort and contract law essentially make no distinction in treat-
ment of the architectural and engineering professions.") (citation omitted)).
3 The sequence of events described herein is representative of the traditional design-
bid-build form of contract procurement. Numerous other organizational structures are used
in the construction industry. See generally JUSTIN SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION LAW 84-97
(1997) (providing an overview of various organizational structures used in the construction
industry including Design-Bid-Build, Fast Tracking (phased construction), Multiple Primes
(separate contracts), Construction Management, and Design-Build). See also Carl J. Circo,
Responsibility for Shared Architectural and Engineering Services: When Specialty Designs Cause
Building Disasters: Responsibility for SharedArchitectural and Engineering Services, 84 NEB. L. REv.
162, 168-72 (2005).
4 A design professional may serve as the representative of the owner during the construc-
tion project to ensure that construction occurs in compliance with the plans and specifica-
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a construction manager to fulfill this role during construction.' Depending
on the complexity of the project, the design professional may enlist the ser-
vices of other specialty consultants6 to assist with the design. Traditionally,
after the design is complete, the owner solicits competitive bids, selects a
general contractor, and enters into a formal contract for the construction of
the project.' The general contractor then separately enters into a network
of contracts with various subcontractors and suppliers who perform work
on discrete portions of the project. The end result is a system of com-
plicated, interwoven contractual relationships in which the various parties
depend on one another to achieve a common goal-the production of a
quality project that meets the owner's expectations, and the generation of a
reasonable profit to all those contributing their labor and expertise.
Construction is a risky business; there are a tremendous number of
variables that can affect the performance of the parties during the course
of a typical project. Problems are inevitable, and disputes are sometimes
unavoidable. A contractor is generally required to use the plans and speci-
fications to provide the owner with a reliable bid for the construction of
the project. In doing so, the contractor relies on the design information to
develop an estimate of the amount of labor and materials required to com-
plete specific tasks on the project. Inevitably, someone makes a mistake,
whether it is in the design of the project, scheduling of construction, supply
of faulty materials, or any other myriad of typical problems encountered
on a project. The bottom line is that one of the parties involved in the
project suffers pecuniary loss due to the improper performance of another's
obligations under its contract with a third party. Generally, the design pro-
fessional becomes a target when parties seek compensation for economic
damages.
8
tions. The design professional generally reviews submittals by the contractor, such as shop
drawings, and the design professional's approval is often required pursuant to the contract.
The design professional might also serve as an arbiter of disputes between the owner and
contractor regarding the interpretation of the plans and specifications. See, e.g., JUSTIN SWEET,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS § 12.02 (5th
ed. 1994).
5 A construction manager is typically used by an owner to provide guidance, in accor-
dance with his or her construction experience, during the design and construction of the
project. During the project, the construction manager is typically responsible for monitoring
compliance with the contract documents and coordinating the schedule of the various stages
of the work. See id. §§ 12.o8, 17.03.
6 For example, an architect (or the owner under separate contract) will typically enlist
the services of a geotechnical engineer to undertake an investigation of the on-site subsurface
conditions to facilitate the design of a proper foundation for a structure. Furthermore, an
architect will typically enlist the services of a structural engineer (either in-house or under
separate contract) to design a structural system to support the building and withstand the ap-
propriate external physical forces acting upon it.
7 Id. § 12.02.
8 Jackson, supra note 2, at 517 ("Suitors have declared 'open season' on architects and en-
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One of the most troublesome issues in construction litigation is wheth-
er a contractor should have a direct cause of action for negligence against a
design professional. This issue has fueled an intense legal debate regard-
ing the liability of a design professional to third parties solely for economic
loss in the absence of a contractual relationship.9 The Kentucky Supreme
Court recently addressed this issue in Presnell Construction Managers, Inc. v.
EH Construction, L.L.C., 10 in which it expressly adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 552 as the standard for negligent misrepresentation in
Kentucky.1 Unfortunately, because the facts did not require the court to
address many of the critical elements of negligent misrepresentation, the
court left many stones unturned in adopting this cause of action. Thus,
Presnell leaves the practitioner with more questions than answers as to
whether the door is now wide open in Kentucky for negligence claims to
be asserted against design professionals solely for economic loss. Further-
more, Justice Keller, in a concurring opinion, 2 chose to address the status
of the economic loss rule13 under Kentucky law, which also left unanswered
the questions as to if-and how-the rule will be applied in future disputes
involving the construction industry.
The purpose of this Note is to dissect the court's opinion and provide
the practitioner with useful guidance as to the necessary elements of a
negligent misrepresentation claim asserted against a design professional.
gineers and professional malpractice claims against the 'once-sacrosanct architectural and en-
gineering professions' have escalated to proportions not thought possible in the early I96os.")
(citations omitted).
9 Seegenerally Anthony F. Earley, Note, Liability of Architects andEngineers:A New Approach,
53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 306 (1978); Murray H. Wright & Edward E. Nicholas, III, The Collision
of Tort and Contract in the Construction Industry, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 457 (1987). This problem
is not unique to the construction industry; courts and commentators continue to debate the
appropriate legal theory under which hybrid tort/contract actions should be analyzed in vari-
ous industries. See GREGORY M. COKINOS & ROBERT A. PLESSALA, TqE TEXAS "ECONOMIC Loss"
RULE AND "CONTORTS," SEPARATING TORT FROM CONTRACT (1998) (presentation at the Defense
Research Institute, Construction Law) available at http://www.cbylaw.com/Publications/gmc-
economic loss.pdf; Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Contortions Along the Boundary between Contracts and
Torts, 69 TUL. L. REv. 457 (1994).
1O Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., L.L.C., 134 S.W.3 d 575 (Ky. 2004).
I I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see infra notes 95-107 and accompany-
ing text.
12 See Presnell, 134 S.W3d at 583-91 (Keller, J., concurring).
13 Simply stated, the economic loss rule prohibits "tort recovery in negligence or prod-
ucts liability absent personal injury or property damage." Anthony L. Meagher & Michael P.
O'Day, Who is Going to Pay for My Impact? A Contractor's Ability to Sue Third Parties for Purely
Economic Loss, CONSTR. LAW. Fall 2005, at 27, 27. "The economic loss doctrine marks the
fundamental boundary between contract law, which is designed to enforce the expectancy
interests of the parties, and tort law, which imposes a duty of reasonable care and thereby
encourages citizens to avoid causing physical harm to others." Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery
of Economic Loss in Tort for Construction Defects: A Critical Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 894-95
(1989).
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Furthermore, it attempts to predict how the Kentucky courts will analyze
this cause of action in the future by looking to other jurisdictions that have
adopted similar lines of reasoning in the context of construction litigation.
Part II addresses the historical debate over the appropriate remedy in cases
possessing a character that can be fairly categorized as either contractual
or tortious.14 Part III provides an in-depth analysis of the opinion issued
by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Presnell.s Part IV presents an analysis
of the standard for liability established in section 552 for negligent mis-
representation and provides useful guidance to the practioner as to how
to proceed under this cause of action in a typical construction dispute.'6
Part V concludes by presenting policy justifications for the ruling issued in
Presnell and explains why this is an appropriate compromise between those
who favor strict adherence to contractual remedies (or a rigid application of
the economic loss rule) and those who favor a broad application of standard
negligence principles. While noting that this cause of action reaches far
beyond design professionals and applies to other individuals engaged in
providing professional services, 7 the scope of this Note is limited to com-
mercial entities involved in a typical construction dispute.
II. HISTORY OF THE DEBATE-TORT OR CONTRACT REMEDIES?
As mentioned previously, the typical construction project involves a com-
plicated series of mutually-independent contracts through which each par-
ty establishes its duties and obligations to its contracting partner. Due to
the presence of sophisticated networks of contractual relationships, courts
and commentators have devoted much attention to whether a third party"8
not in privity with a design professional should be able to assert a claim in
tort for economic loss or should be limited to contractual remedies against
the individual with whom he or she is in privity. '9 The amount of com-
mentary devoted to this topic is staggering. An extended discussion of all
positions is beyond the scope of this Note, but understanding the logic of
14 See infra notes 18-66 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 67-125 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 126-97 and accompanying text.
17 Courts have imposed a duty to avoid the negligent infliction of economic loss upon
attorneys, accountants, design professionals, termite inspectors, and other individuals in the
business of supplying information for the guidance of others. See, e.g., Lieder, infra note 22,
at 1014-15.
18 In the context of construction litigation, third parties asserting claims against a design
professional often include contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, surety companies,
purchasers of real estate, and subsequent purchasers of a home (in the context of latent de-
fects).
19 See, e.g., Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Cmry. Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 560 N.E.2d
2o6, zo8 (Ohio 199o); Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724, 726 (Va. 1987); Berschauer/
Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. i, 881 P2d 986, 99o-91 (Wash. 1994);.
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the Presnell opinion requires a brief discussion of various positions taken by
courts and commentators on the issue.
A. Demise of the Privity Doctrine Opens the Door
for Tort Actions against Design Professionals
Historically, design professionals could rely upon the safety of their con-
tractual relationships and enter into transactions with predictable certainty
that their liability would not extend beyond those with whom they were in
privity 0 However, the privity defense" has gradually eroded in American
jurisprudence 2 and no longer provides a defense to design professionals
in most jurisdictions. 3 Kentucky is now among those jurisdictions that
have abolished the privity requirement in actions against a design profes-
sional.2 4
20 See Earley, supra note 9, at 307 ("Despite variance in theories of recovery, the doctrine
of privity provided an effective defense to third party actions against the architect or engineer
for negligence.") (citations omitted)).
21 The privity defense first originated with the ancient English case of Winterbottom v.
Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402. However, it has been argued that, in fact, the court "held only
that the obligation of a contract could give no right of action to one who was not a contracting
party" and that "American courts erroneously applied" the holding to create the doctrine of
privity in tort cases. Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.zd 179, 186 (Ky. 1985) (citation omitted).
22 The privity doctrine was gradually abolished beginning with Justice Cardozo's land-
mark opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., i i N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), in which a Plaintiff
with personal injuries was permitted to bring a negligence claim against the manufacturer
of a defective car wheel with whom he was not in privity. "By 1966, the rule established in
MacPherson had been adopted throughout the United States." Wright & Nicholas, supra note
9, at 466. One commentator notes that "lack of privity remains ... a viable defense to con-
struction defect suits in at least five states." Michael D. Lieder, Constructing a New Action for
Negligent Infliction of Economic Loss: Building on Cardozo and Coase, 66 WASH. L. REV. 937, 944
(1991) (referencing cases from New York, New Jersey, Alabama, Maryland, and Ohio, which
essentially hold that a professional is not liable for pure economic loss absent privity of con-
tract or sufficient nexus between the parties resembling privity).
23 See, e.g., Frank D. Wagner, Annotation, Tort Liability of Project Architect for Economic
Damages Sufferedbv Contractor, 65 A.L.R.3 d 249 (1974).
Although, under the traditional general rule, privity of contract was
required before a cause of action could arise from the negligent breach
of a duty existing by virtue of contract, this requirement has been gradu-
ally eliminated in many jurisdictions, at first with respect to actions for
personal injuries or death, and later in regard to suits predicated upon
harm to intangible economic interests.
Id. at 252. See also Note, ArchitecturalMalpractice: A Contract-Based Approach, 92 HMv. L. REV.
1075, 1075 n.5 (1979) (stating that Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 143 N.E.2d 895
(N.Y. 1957), is the leading case eliminating the protection of the privity doctrine in cases
regarding architect liability for negligence).
24 See Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., L.L.C., 134 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Ky.
2004) (noting that privity is no longer required to maintain a tort action).
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The frequency of tort claims asserted against design professionals in-
creased with the abolishment of the privity requirement; these claims are
now routine in the context of construction litigation."5 Much of the original
criticism of the privity doctrine originated in the context of products li-
ability cases. 6 In this scenario the injustice seems clear, and traditional
tort policies support the disregard of the privity requirement. 7 However,
when a plaintiff suffers purely economic loss the distinction between tort
and contractual remedies is blurred, and our legal system has struggled to
determine the proper doctrines that apply in such situations.
B. The Argument for Reliance on Contractual Remedies
Many commentators 8 and some courts 9 advocate the position that com-
mercial parties involved in construction disputes should be limited to their
25 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
26 William David Flatt, Note, The Expanding Liability of Design Professionals, 20 U. MEM.
L. REV. 61I, 612-15 (discussing the abandonment of the privity doctrine in products liability
suits and its eventual affect on design professionals in the state of Tennessee).
27 "Courts and legislatures prescribe rules of tort liability to serve certain fundamental
policies-most importantly, compensating victims of harm; deterring wrongful conduct; plac-
ing losses on those who can and should bear or distribute them; and ensuring fairness.... JAY
M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF PROFESSIONALS AND BUSINESSES TO THIRD
PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC Loss 13 (1995).
28 See Barrett, supra note 13 (advocating a bright-line rule for the application of the eco-
nomic loss doctrine to prohibit the recovery of economic loss in the context of owner/con-
tractor/design professional disputes); Susan Lorde Martin, If Privily is Dead, Let's Resurrect It:
Liability of Professionals to Third Partiesfor Economic Injury Caused by Negligent Misrepresentation,
28 AM. Bus. L.J. 649 (I99 I ) (arguing for the adoption of a uniform limited privity standard to
analyze the liability of a design professional with exceptions based on the inability of third
parties to protect themselves and a lack of existing incentives for the design professional to
avoid errors); Thomas R. Yocum & Charles F. Hollis, The Economic Loss Rule in Kentucky: Will
Contract Law Drown in a Sea of Tor?, 28 N. Ky. L. REV. 456 (2001) (stating that the economic
loss rule should bar a contractor from asserting a claim solely for economic loss against a design
professional); Michael T Terwilliger, Note, Economic Loss in the Construction Context: Should
Architects Be Liable for the Commercial Expectations of Contractors?, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 257 (1996)
(advocating the adoption of a per se rule against architect liability for economic loss in the
traditional design-bid-build delivery system where an adversarial relationship exists between
the architect and the third party).
29 See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982) (economic
loss rule applied to bar negligence claim against manufacturer for tank defect); Floor Craft
Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Cmty. Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 560 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 199o) (contractor
not allowed to recover damages in tort or contract from architect absent privity or sufficient
nexus which could serve as substitute for privity); Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724
(Va. 1987) (stating that there is no common law duty on behalf of an architect to protect a con-
tractor from economic loss and no recovery in tort for only economic loss in absence of priv-
ity); Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 993 (Wash. 1994)
(holding that when parties have contracted to protect against potential economic liability,
purely economic damages are not recoverable in an action for negligent misrepresentation).
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contractual remedies when asserting claims for purely economic loss. The
common thread in so-called "economic negligence"30 cases is that damages
are almost always the result of a failure to properly perform contractual
duties owed to a third party participant in the project.3 Proponents of
sole reliance on contractual remedies usually frame their arguments in the
context of the economic loss rule3" or by advocating adherence to a strict
privity or near privity requirement.33
1. The Role of the Economic Loss Rule in Barring Tort Claims for Pecuniary
Loss.-The economic loss rule originated with the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint' in 1927."s Although the
doctrine originally developed in the context of products liability, its appli-
cation has gradually expanded and it is also applied in the context of service
industries by some courts.3 6 "An 'economic loss' is [defined as] the loss of
an expectancy interest created by contract, often described as the 'benefit
of the bargain.' 3 7 More specifically, economic losses include "damages for
inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of [a] defective prod-
uct, or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or
30 FEINMAN, supra note 27, at 3 ("The law of economic negligence concerns the liability
that a party to a contract [design professional] owes to a third person [contractor] when the
party's breach or negligent performance of the contract causes economic loss to the third
person.").
31 For example, an owner usually contracts separately with the design professional.
Thus, the design professional has no contractual relationship with the contractor. However,
the contractor may suffer economic loss as a result of the architect's failure to properly perform
his contractual duties owed to the owner. Typically, these claims will take the form of a failure
to provide adequate plans and specifications or a failure to perform an administrative duty
under the contract.
32 See supra notes 13 & 29.
33 See, e.g., Clevecon, Inc. v. N.E. Ohio Reg'l Sewer Dist., 628 N.E.zd 143, 146 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that "lack of privity is not an absolute bar to a design professional's mal-
practice action when there is a nexus that can serve as a substitute for privity").
34 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). In Robins, the plaintiff
brought a negligence action to recover damages for lost use of a chartered boat. The defen-
dant was under a contract to repair the boat with its owner but had no contractual relation to
the plaintiff. In denying the cause of action, the Court stated that "as a general rule, at least, a
tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely
because the injured person was under a contract with that other .... The Law does not spread
its protection so far." Id. at 309. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the economic
loss rule, see R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss
Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1789-1803
(2000).
35 Meagher & O'Day, supra note 13, at 27. But see Barton, supra note 34, at 1794 (stating
that the economic loss doctrine was first articulated by a California court in Seely v. WhiteMotor
Co., 403 P2d 145 (Cal. 1965)).
36 See supra note 17.
37 Barrett, supra note 13, at 895.
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damage to other property. ' 38 "In its broadest formulation, the economic
loss rule prohibits tort recovery in negligence or products liability 'absent
physical injury to a proprietary interest."' 39 Accordingly, courts generally
have barred negligence or product liability suits unless the plaintiff has
suffered personal injury or property damage.40
"In the construction context, the claims most commonly barred by the
economic loss rule [are] for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and
fraud."'41 An illustrative case is BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc.41 in which
the Colorado Supreme Court barred a subcontractor (Dufficy) from assert-
ing negligence claims 43 against an engineer (BRW) and a construction in-
spector (PSI). BRW was under contract with the owner to prepare plans
and specifications for the construction of two bridges;" PSI was under con-
tract with the owner to provide inspection services during construction to
ensure compliance with the plans and specifications. Dufficy entered into
a contract with another subcontractor for the fabrication, painting, and ship-
ment of structural steel for the bridge.4 Dufficy incurred economic dam-
ages due to unexpected delays in the application of paint to the structural
steel members, allegedly due to the selection of an improper paint system
by the design professional. In formulating the economic loss rule, the BRW
Court stated, "a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of an
express or implied contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a
breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law."46 The court
provided three main policy reasons for applying the economic loss rule to
38 Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443,449 (Ill. 1982).
39 Presnell Constr. Mangers, Inc. v. EH Constr., L.L.C., 134 S.W.3 d 575, 584 (Ky. 2004)
(Keller, J., concurring).
40 Meagher & O'Day, supra note t3, at 27.
4I Patricia H. Thompson & Christine Dean, Who is Going to Pay for My Impact? A
Contractor's Ability to Sue Third Partiesfor Purely Economic Loss, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2005, at 37.
For a state-by-state assessment of the application of the economic loss rule in the construc-
tion context, see COMM. ON CONSTR. LITIG., AM. BAR ASS'N, STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY OF THE
ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE IN CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION (1996).
42 BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66 (Colo. 2004).
43 Dufficy asserted claims for both negligence and negligent misrepresentation against
BRW and PSI. Id. at 70.
44 Id. at 68. BRW's contract with the owner provided that its work would be performed
"in accordance with the standards of care, skill and diligence provided by competent profes-
sionals who perform work or services of a similar nature." Id. BRW also agreed that its draw-
ings and specifications would "represent a thorough study and competent solution for the
Project as per usual and customary professional standards and shall reflect all architectural and
engineering skills applicable to that phase of the project." Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 72 (quoting Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., io P.3d 1256, 1264 (Colo.
2ooo)). As will be discussed later in this Note, Justice Keller proposed the adoption of this
formulation of the economic loss rule under Kentucky law. See infra notes io8-25 and accom-
panying text.
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bar a negligence claim (solely for economic loss) in the context of a con-
struction dispute between commercial parties:
(1) to maintain a distinction between contract and tort law; (2) to enforce
expectancy interests of the parties so that they can reliably allocate risks
and costs during their bargaining; and (3) to encourage the parties to build
the cost considerations into the contract because they will not be able to
recover economic damages in tort.
47
In its holding, the court emphasized the importance of the parties' contrac-
tual relationship in determining whether a design professional should owe
a duty to the contractor. The court stated:
Our economic loss rule requires the court to focus on the contractual rela-
tionship between the parties, rather than their professional status, in de-
termining the existence of an independent duty of care. The interrelated
contracts in this case contained BRW's and PSI's duty of care. Dufficy's
tort claims are based on duties that are imposed by contract and therefore,
contract law provides the remedies. Accordingly, the economic loss rule
bars Dufficy's tort claims.
This court's reasoning is typical of those who apply the economic loss rule
to bar negligence claims asserted by a contractor against a design profes-
sional absent privity of contract.49
2. Out of Bounds!-Maintaining the Distinction between Contract and Tort-
Proponents of contractual remedies typically place great importance on the
role of contracts in the allocation of economic risks among owners, contrac-
tors, and design professionals. A representative view of this position is pro-
47 Id. at 72 (citing Town ofAlma, so P.3d at 1262).
48 Id. at 67-68.
49 See R.H. Macy & Co. v. Williams Tile & Terrazzo Co., 585 E Supp. 175 (N.D. Ga. 1984);
State v. Tyonek Timber, Inc. 680 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1984); Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc.,
6o8 A.2d 1194, 1198 (Del. 1992); City Express, Inc. v. Express Partners, 959 P.2d 836 (Haw.
1998); Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., io8 P3d 996 (Idaho zoo5); Prendiville v. Contemporary
Homes, Inc., 83 P.3d 1257, 1264 (Kan. Ct. App. 2oo4); Real Estate Mktg. v. Franz, 885 S.W.ad
921, 926-27 (Ky. 1994); Fleischer v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 832 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993); Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Cmty. Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 560 N.E.2d
2o6 (Ohio 199o); E.J. Robinson Glass Co. v. Pilot Contracting Corp., No. C-o 10296, 2001 WL
1887714 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 19, zoos) (privity of contract or substantial nexus approaching
privity required to recover economic loss); Thomson v. Espey Huston & Assocs., 899 S.W.2d
415 (Tex. App. 1995); SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., z8 P.3 d
669, 682-84 (Utah zoo); Gerald M. Moore & Son, Inc. v. Drewry, 467 S.E.zd 811 (Va. 1996);
Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724 (Va. 1987); Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Sheridan Area
Water Supply, 929 Pad 1228 (Wyo. 1996).
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vided by the Washington Supreme Court in BerschauerlPhillips Construction
Co. v. Seattle School District No. 1.50 The issue before the court was whether
a general contractor could recover economic damages caused by construc-
tion delays from an architect, a structural engineer, and a project inspector,
none of whom where in privity with the contractor. Berschauer/Phillips
(BP) had entered into a contract to build an elementary school."1 BP as-
serted breach of contract claims against the owner but also asserted negli-
gence claims against (1) the architect and structural engineer for inaccurate
and incomplete structural engineering plans, and (2) the project inspector
for negligently failing to inspect the erection of structural steel during con-
struction of the school.
2
In holding that the economic loss rule barred the contractor from recov-
ering purely economic damages in tort, the court provided a typical view of
those advocating reliance on contractual remedies for recovery of economic
loss:
We follow the Stuarts3 and Atherton 4 line of cases and maintain the funda-
mental boundaries of tort and contract law by limiting the recovery of eco-
nomic loss due to construction delays to the remedies provided by contract.
We so hold to ensure that the allocation of risk and the determination of
potential future liability is based on what the parties bargained for in the
contract. We hold parties to their contracts. If tort and contract remedies
were allowed to overlap, certainty and predictability in allocating risk would
decrease and impede future business activity. The construction industry in
particular would suffer, for it is in this industry that we see most clearly the
importance of the precise allocation of risk as secured by contract. The fees
charged by architects, engineers, contractors, developers, vendors, and so on
are founded on their expected liability exposure as bargained and provided
for in the contract.
55
The Berschauer/Phillips court also touched upon another argument ad-
vanced by proponents of the contractual approach-namely that "the ex-
pansion of duty in tort liability to include economic interests would expose
50 Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986 (Wash. 1994).
51 Id. at 988.
52 Id. at 989.
53 Stuart . Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, 745 P.2d 1284, 1290-92 (Wash. 1987)
(A condominium association asserted negligence claims against a contractor for construction
defects resulting solely in economic loss. The negligence claim was dismissed, and the asso-
ciation was limited to its contractual remedy under the implied warranty of habitability.).
54 Atherton Condo. Apartment-Owners Ass'n v. Blume Dev. Co., 799 P.zd 250, 266 n.17
(Wash. 199o) (stating that owner's claim for economic loss against an architect is not a recog-
nizable claim for negligence).
55 BerschauerPhillips, 881 P.2d at 992.
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defendants 'to liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class."'5 6 However, in the commercial context
of construction litigation, the propensity for indeterminate liability seems
unfounded because of the limited number of parties relying on the infor-
mation provided and the foreseeable class of plaintiffs-namely contrac-
tors-who must clearly rely on the plans and specifications prepared by the
design professional in constructing a project.57
Doctrinally, the application of the economic loss rule and the position
that contractors should be limited to their contractual remedies both reach
the same result. In reality, the latter is simply an argument supporting the
expansion of the economic loss rule to serve as an absolute bar to third-
party actions against design professionals in a commercial setting. As with
most tort-related doctrines, both these positions reflect a court's policy de-
cision that a design professional should not owe a duty to a third party to
avoid causing economic loss.
Construction projects involve sophisticated parties who have the op-
portunity to bargain for certain remedies when negotiating their contracts.
Accordingly, some argue that the contractor should be restricted to reliance
on contractual remedies against the owner, who may then seek indemnifi-
cation from a design professional if the professional has not performed his
or her contractual duties owed to the owner. However, those advocating
this view actually may be reading a bit too much into the contract nego-
tiation process. In reality, standard form contracts are widely used in the
industry and their provisions typically favor design professionals. Thus, a
conclusion that a contractor has the ability to freely bargain for available
remedies may be a bit misleading. Many jurisdictions have either refused
to apply the economic loss rule in the context of construction disputes or
recognized limited exceptions to the doctrine.1
8
C. The Argument for the Imposition of Tort Liability
In modern construction litigation, contractors will almost always assert a
negligence claim against a design professional in addition to contractual
56 Id. (quoting Ultamares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 193)). Justice
Cardozo's opinion in Ultramars is recognized as the landmark case regarding accountant li-
ability for economic loss to third parties. Cardozo's concerns are still reflected today in the
context of construction litigation in New York. In negligent misrepresentation cases where a
plaintiff seeks compensation solely for economic loss, New York requires that the "underly-
ing relationship between the parties be one of contract or the bond between them so close
as to be the functional equivalent of contractual privity." Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v.
Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91, 91 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that owner in privity with architectural firm
can assert a professional negligence claim against third-party engineering consultants retained
by architect, where relationship is the functional equivalent of privity).
57 See Terwilliger, supra note z8, at 28z.
58 See infra notes 62-63.
2oo6-2oo7]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
claims they may have against their contracting partner.s9 There are nu-
merous practical reasons why a contractor might elect to pursue a claim in
tort, rather than resort to contractual remedies: (1) the contractor might be
attempting to avoid contract provisions which restrict potential recovery
from his or her contract partner;' (2) the entity with whom he or she is in
privity may have become insolvent; (3) the potential pool of litigants who
might contribute to a settlement may be increased by pursuing negligence
claims; (4) the contractor may be seeking to take advantage of professional
malpractice liability insurance as a potential source of recovery; and (5)
consequential damages are generally easier to recover in a negligence ac-
tion.61 Courts addressing the imposition of tort liability on design profes-
sionals have typically done so under one of three theories: general negli-
gence, 62 negligent misrepresentation,
63 or third-party beneficiary theory.
64
59 Those in privity with a design professional (i.e., the owner) have been allowed to
recover in both contract and tort. See Martha Crandall Coleman, Liability of Design Professionals
for Negligent Design and Project Management, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 923, 924 (1998); see also Penco,
Inc. v. Detrex Chem. Indus., 672 S.W.2d 948,951 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (citing B & C Constr. Co.
v. Grain Handling Corp., 52! S.W.2d 98 (Tex. App. 1975)) (party with breach of contract claim
may sometimes sue in tort for its breach).
60 One such provision is a "no damage for delay clause" which places the risk of mon-
etary damages for delay on the contractor and limits the remedy for delay to time extensions,
regardless of which party, if any, is responsible for the delay (for example, it could be weather-
related). See SWEET, supra note 3, §26.IO.
61 See Wright & Nicholas, supra note 22, at 457-58.
62 See, e.g., United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958); A.R.
Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1973), questioned in Casa Clara Condo. Ass'n, v.
Charley Toppino & Sons, 620 So. 2d 1244, 1248 n. 9 (Fla. 1993) (limititing Moyer strictly to
its facts).
63 See, e.g., Hewett-Kier Constr., Inc. v. Lemuel Ramos & Assocs., 775 So. 2d 373 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2ooo) (economic loss rule does not bar action for purely economic losses where a
special relationship is established under section 552); Robert & Co. v. Rhodes-Haverty P'ship,
300 S.E.2d 503, 504 (Ga. 1983) (recognizing an exception to economic loss rule for negligent
misrepresentation); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (I11. 1982) (noting an
exception to the economic loss rule in Illinois for negligent misrepresentation); Nota Constr.
Corp. v. Keyes Assocs., 694 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc.
v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.zd 270 (Pa. 2005); E. Steel Constructors, Inc. v. City of Salem,
549 S.E.2d 266 (W. Va. 2001) (discussed in Robert M. Stonestreet, Note, Replacinga Solid all
with a Chain-Link Fence: Special Relationship Analysisfor Tort Recovery of Purely Economic Loss,
io5 W. V. L. REV. 213 (2002)).
64 Third party beneficiary theory has not been very successful for plaintiffs in construc-
tion litigation. See Jean Fleming Powers, Expanded Liability and the Intent Requirement in Third
Party Beneficiary Contracts, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 67, 86 (1993) ("Generally it has been held that
the ordinary construction contract-i.e. one which does not expressly state the intention of
the contracting parties is to benefit a third party-does not give third parties who contract
with the promisee the right to enforce the latter's contract with another."); Circo, supra note
3, at I85-86 ("One not a party to the design contract might seek a route around the privity
roadblock by claiming to be a third-party beneficiary, but that route often proves to be a nar-
row one. The courts have not often been receptive to this argument in construction cases.");
see also infra note 86-87 and accompanying text.
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While the majority of courts seem to apply the economic loss rule to bar
general negligence claims, many recognize an exception to the doctrine for
the tort of negligent misrepresentation. 65 Some commentators believe this
is the proper approach because it represents a just compromise between a
broad negligence standard and a per se rule barring recovery of economic
lOSS. 66 Furthermore, the elements of negligent misrepresentation properly
address many of the traditional criticisms of tort recovery for economic loss
in the absence of privity. The Kentucky Supreme Court recently had the
opportunity to address this situation in Presnell.
III. PRESNELL-KENTUCKY EXPLICITLY ADOPTS THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 AS THE STANDARD
FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
Prior to Presnell,67 the Kentucky Court of Appeals had either principally ap-
plied or explicitly stated that negligent misrepresentation is a recognized
cause of action;68 however, the Kentucky Supreme Court had yet to weigh
in on the issue. In accordance with the principles applied by the lower
courts, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that negligent misrep-
resentation is a recognized cause of action in Kentucky and adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. 69 This discussion is limited to the
application of section 552 in construction litigation. However, the adoption
65 See, e.g., Robert,&Co., 300 S.E.2d at 504 (recognizing an exception to economic loss rule
for negligent misrepresentation); Moorman Mfg. Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (noting an exception to
the economic loss rule in Illinois for negligent misrepresentation). The Moorman exception
for negligent misrepresentation has been limited in subsequent cases involving design pro-
fessionals in Illinois. See 2314 Lincoln Park West Condo. Ass'n v. Mann, Gin Ebel & Frazier,
Ltd., 555 N.E.zd 346,351 (11. 199o) (opining that information supplied by an architect which
is transformed into a building does not fit within the negligent misrepresentation exception
to the economic loss rule).
66 See FEINMAN,SUpra note 27, at 186-89. Feinman states that the "[niegligent misrepre-
sentation doctrine comes the closest to incorporating all the relevant issues in economic negli-
gence cases." Id. at 186. This approach has "often been adopted as a middle ground between
the narrow third party beneficiary law and the broad law of negligence." Id. at 187.
67 Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., L.L.C., 134 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2004).
68 See Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 684 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (predicting
that the Kentucky Supreme Court would recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation
in the context of an accountant negligently causing economic loss to a third party); Morton
v. Bank of the Bluegrass, 18 S.W.3 d 353, 358 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing that negligent
misrepresentation was a proper cause of action in the context of representations made by an
insurer to its insured); Seigle v. Jasper, 867 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (negligent
misrepresentation applied to an attorney performing a title examination); Chernick v. Fasig-
Tipton Kentucky, Inc., 703 S.W.zd 885, 889-9o (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (Fasig-Tipton had duty to
provide a prospective purchaser with accurate information in the catalog of sale).
69 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 will be hereinafter referred to as "section
552.
"
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of this standard also affects other professionals participating in a service
industry.70
A. An Analysis of the Opinion Issued in Presnell and its Related Authorities
1. The Facts of the Case.-Presnell presents a set of facts that typically arises
in the context of a claim in which a plaintiff seeks to recover economic
damages from a design professional with whom he or she was not in privity.
In May 1996, Delor Design Group, Inc. ("Delor"), the owner, entered into
a contract 71 with Presnell Construction Managers, Inc. ("Presnell"), the de-
sign professional, to act as the construction manager for the renovation of a
commercial building.7 In March 1997, Delor entered into a contract 73 with
EH Construction, LLC ("EH"), the contractor, to furnish "general trades"
work for the project. Work proceeded, but in November 1997, EH filed a
lien against Delor's real property for materials and labor supplied to Delor
for which it did not receive payment.7 4 In February 1998, EH filed suit
7
"to recover damages for its economic losses, which EH alleged were the re-
sult of Presnell's alleged negligent misrepresentation and negligent super-
vision of the Project."76 EH alleged that Presnell "failed 'to properly stage
and time the work involved' for the project and that as a result, EH 'was
required to redo much of the work that it had already completed, due to
other contractors and subcontractors coming in and subsequently destroy-
ing work that had already been completed by [EH].' 77 EH also alleged
that "Presnell was careless and negligent in coordinating the project, and
supplied faulty information and guidance and supervision to the contrac-
tors working on the Project.""8
70 This cause of action is routinely applied in the context of accountant and attorney
negligence.
71 Delor and Presnell entered into a Standard American Institute of Architects (AIA)
contract titled "Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager
where the Construction Manager is NOT a Constructor." Presnell, 134 S.W.3d at 577.
72 See also supra note 5 and accompanying text providing description of typical role of
construction manager.
73 Delor and EH entered into a Standard AIA contract titled "Standard Form of
Agreement Between Owner and Contractor." Id. at 577.
74 Id.
75 EH also sought to enforce its lien against Delor, but Delor was dismissed from the suit
due to a mediation/arbitration provision in its contract which precluded the use of a judicial
proceeding to resolve disputes originating from the contract between EH and Delor. Id. at
578 n.z.
76 Id. at 578.
77 Id. (quoting EH complaint).
78 Id. (quoting EH complaint).
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2. Ruling Issued by the Court of Appeals.-The trial court dismissed EH's
negligence claim against Presnell "on the ground that all of Presnell's
duties were under its contract to Delor and that Presnell had no duty to
EH.'' 79 EH appealed, urging that privity between EH and Presnell was not
required for a duty to arise and advocating the adoption of section 552.80
The court of appeals sided with EH and adopted section 552 as the stan-
dard for negligent misrepresentation.
In analyzing section 552 in the context of construction disputes, the
court of appeals cited with approval s' an opinion issued by the Tennessee
Supreme Court in John Martin Co. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc.,' 2 a case with facts
strikingly similar to those of Presnell. Morse/Diesel was under contract with
the owner to serve as the construction manager83 throughout the course of
a project to construct a commercial building. 4 John Martin Co., under con-
tract with the owner, allegedly suffered additional costs and delays during
the pouring of concrete due to inaccurate elevations supplied by Morse/
Diesel.
The MorselDiesel court held that "a subcontractor, despite a lack of priv-
ity, may make a [negligent misrepresentation] claim against the construc-
tion manager... whether the negligence was in the form of negligent direc-
tion or supervision. '8 During the course of its opinion, the court addressed
many of the traditional criticisms advanced for imposing tort liability for
economic loss incurred by third parties, but concluded that section 552
provides a reasonable approach for the imposition of negligence liability
79 EH Constr., L.L.C. v. Delor Design Group, Inc., No. 1998-CA-oo1476-MR, 2ooo Ky.
App. LEXIS 29, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2ooo), aff'dsub nom. Presnell Constr. Managers,
Inc. v. EH Constr., L.L.C., 134 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2004).
8o Id. at *4.
81 Id. at *10-1 3 .
82 John Martin Co. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.zd 428 (Tenn. i991) (holding that de-
spite lack of privity, a subcontractor may assert a negligent misrepresentation claim against a
construction manager, whether the negligence is in the form of negligent direction or supervi-
sion).
83 More specifically, Morse/Diesel's contract specified that he was "to act [on] behalf
of the owner in the employment of the necessary subcontractors, the coordination of their
schedule, and the supervision of their work." Id. at 429. Morse/Diesel was also responsible
for reviewing and approving the plans and specifications prepared for the use of the subcon-
tractors. Id.
84 This project was to be constructed by the "fast-track" method. In this method of
contract organization, plans and specifications are typically not complete when construction
begins and separate phases of the project are initiated upon their completion. Id. In this con-
text, planning and organization are critical and the construction manager is typically respon-
sible for performing these functions. Contractually, the owner entered into separate agree-
ments with each entity to construct different portions of the structure. Acting as agent for the
owner, Morse/Diesel executed a subcontract with John Martin to provide concrete and rough
carpentry for the superstructure of the building. Id. at 429-30.
85 Id. at 429.
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for economic loss. Specifically, the court noted that "the burden is always
upon the Plaintiff to establish that the supplier [of information] violated his
duty to exercise due care and competence in obtaining or communicating
the information."8 16 Additionally, the plaintiff must be able to establish that
its reliance on the information provided by the supplier was both foresee-
able and justified, and comparative negligence on behalf of the user may
be asserted as a defense.87 "Each of these principles provides reasonable
protection against the proliferation of litigation in this area of tort... [sec-
tion 552] suggest[s] a properly balanced approach." 8 While Morse/Diesel
expresses a view typical of courts adopting section 552, it is unlikely that
this cause of action will be applied as broadly in Kentucky courts.89
3. The Ruling issued by the Kentucky Supreme Court.-a. Privity of Contract.-
The Supreme Court first focused its attention on whether EH was a third-
party beneficiary of the contract entered into between Presnell and Delor,
which could provide one avenue through which EH might recover damag-
es for Presnell's breach of a duty arising by contract. The court recognized
the long-standing principle that "the obligations arising out of a contract
are due only to those with whom it is made. .. [and] cannot be enforced
by a person who is not a party to it or in privity with it ... or, under certain
circumstances, by a third-party beneficiary."9 However, the court found
that EH was "at ... most, an incidental beneficiary of the contract" and
reiterated the long-standing proposition that "[o]nly a third party who was
intended by the parties to benefit from the contract, namely, a donee or a
creditor beneficiary, has standing to sue on a contract; an incidental benefi-
ciary does not acquire such right."91 The contracts entered into by the various
86 Id. at 435.
87 Id.
88 Id. This discussion was primarily in response to Justice Cardozo's warnings expressed
in Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922) (expressing the "end and aim" of the trans-
action approach) and Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (sufficient nexus
required-privity or near privity) against the imposition of limitless liability for misrepresen-
tations resulting in economic loss to parties with whom an individual has no privity.
89 The Kentucky Supreme Court does not appear to have adopted quite as broad a view
of this tort as that expressed in Morse/Diesel. In Presnell, the Court explicitly ruled that a claim
for negligent supervision was not actionable because it did not arise from a duty independent
of a contractual duty. Accordingly, "one who is not a party to the contract or in privity thereto
may not maintain an action for negligence which consists merely in the breach of the con-
tract." Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., L.L.C., 134 S.W.3 d 575, 579 (Ky. 2004).
This highlights the Court's adherence to the doctrine that a contractor's cause of action for
economic loss must arise from a design professional's independent duty arising outside the
context of its contract with the owner.
90 Id. at 579 (citations omitted).
91 Id. at 579-80 (emphasis added). This is representative of the view of the majority of
courts focusing on the "intent requirement" under third party beneficiary theories. These
arguments are rarely successful in the context of construction disputes, primarily as a result
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parties clearly indicated that EH was not an intended beneficiary of the
contract entered into between Presnell and Delor,92 and thus, EH had no
standing to sue on the contract.
In addressing the status of the privity requirement as a prerequisite for
an action in tort, the court stated:
[P]rivity is no longer required to maintain a tort action, [but] one who is not
a party to the contract or in privity thereto may not maintain an action for
negligence which consists merely in the breach of the contract. Accord-
ingly, unless Presnell breached some duty to EH apart from its duties to
DeLor under the contract-i.e. an independent duy-EH, who was at the
most, an incidental beneficiary of the contract between DeLor and Presnell,
cannot maintain an action in negligence against Presnell.93
Therefore, the court ruled that EH's common law negligence claim for neg-
ligent supervision was barred because it arose solely from contractual du-
ties owed by Presnell to Delor.94 However, in order to determine whether
Presnell owed EH an additional independent duty outside of its contract,
the court turned to the tort of negligent misrepresentation.
b. Negligent Misrepresentation.-The court explicitly adopted section 552
as the standard for negligent misrepresentation in Kentucky. Section 552
states:
§ 552 Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
of standard contract clauses which typically disclaim the extension of any third party rights
to a contractor by virtue of the owner/design professional contract. See supra note 64 and ac-
companying text.
92 The clause included in the contract stated:
The Contractor agrees that nothing contained in the Contract
Documents or any agreement between the Owner and the Construction
Manager or the Owner and the Design Professional creates any con-
tractual relationship between the Construction Manager . . . and the
Contractor. The Contractor waives any right the Contractor may have as
an alleged third-party beneficiary of any such agreements and covenants
not to sue the Construction Manager... as a third-party beneficiary of
such agreements.
Id. at 577.
93 Id. at 579-80 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
94 Id. at 582-83 ("EH's claim for negligent supervision does not articulate a claim that
is independent of Presnell's contractual duties."). The majority opinion offered very little
analysis on this issue.
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information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is sub-
ject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance
upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence
in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1)
is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit
and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the infor-
mation to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a sub-
stantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the
duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect
them.9'
The court first traced the history of this cause of action as it has devel-
oped in the lower appellate courts' and various federal courts97 of Kentucky.
The court concluded that section 552 is "consistent with Kentucky case
law" and joined "the majority of jurisdictions" in adopting its "standards
for negligent misrepresentation claims" in Kentucky.9" Primarily because
the subject of the appeal was a motion to dismiss, the court did not analyze
the facts of the case to determine if EH could prevail on its claim. Further-
more, aside from noting that that section 552 is consistent with Kentucky
law, the Kentucky Supreme Court expressed few policy justifications for
the imposition of liability in this context. Presnell, therefore, offers little
95 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTs § 552.
96 Presnell, 134 S.W.3d at 580-82.
97 See Scheck Mech. Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 186 F Supp. 2d 724, 734 (W.D. Ky. 2oo1)
(predicting that Kentucky would recognize section 552 based on its general adoption of the
Restatement in tort situations); Goldman Servs. Mech. Contracting, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 812
F. Supp. 738, 742 (W.D. Ky. 1992) (expressing the same view as the Scheck court), aff'd, Nos.
92-5654/5655, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 27733 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 1993); Ingram Indus. v. Nowicki,
527 F. Supp. 683, 684 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (predicting that the Kentucky Supreme Court would
recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation in the context of an accountant negligently
causing economic loss to a third party). But see Miller's Bottled Gas, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp.,
955 F2d 1043, 1053 (6th Cir. 1992) (predicting that Kentucky would not allow recovery on a
negligent misrepresentation claim solely for economic loss).
98 Presnell, 134 S.W.3d at 582.
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guidance to potential litigants regarding the circumstances under which
relief is available.
What can be taken from the Presnell opinion is that "privity is not nec-
essary to maintain a tort action" and through its adoption of section 552,
Kentucky now recognizes that "the tort of negligent misrepresentation
defines an independent duty for which recovery in tort for economic loss
is available."" In Presnell, the court found that section 552 created a duty
on behalf of Presnell "not to supply false information," and since EH's
complaint alleged that "Presnell supplied faulty information and guidance
to the project's contractors," the cause of action was allowed to survive
Presnell's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could
be granted.'0 0
The lower appellate court's opinion offers a bit more insight into the
supporting rationale for section 552101 and situations where a defendant's
conduct might lead to liability for negligent misrepresentation. The court
of appeals stated that in order for EH to prevail on its claim against Presnell
for negligent misrepresentation it must be able to prove that:
(1) Presnell was acting in the course of its business, profession, or employ-
ment, or in a transaction in which it had a pecuniary (as opposed to gratu-
itous) interest; (2) Presnell supplied faulty information intended to guide
others in their business transactions; (3) Presnell failed to exercise reason-
able care in obtaining or communicating the information; and (4) EH justifi-
ably relied upon the information and thereby incurred pecuniary loss.0 2
The court of appeals also offered further insight into the source of the
independent duty created under section 552. Initially, the court examined
the contract between Presnell and Delor to discern exactly what responsi-
bilities'013 Presnell had in the administration of the contract, and found that
99 Id.
1oo Id.
o1 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing the policy rationale sup-
porting the imposition of liability under section 552 for a design professional's negligent mis-
representation).
102 EH Constr., L.L.C. v. Delor Design Group, Inc., No. 1998-CA-oo1476-
MR, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 29, at *14 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2ooo), aff'd sub nom.
Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., L.L.C., 134 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2004).
103 The terms of Presnell's contract stated as follows:
The contract between Presnell and Delor provided ... that Presnell
shall provide administrative, management and related services to coor-
dinate scheduled activities and responsibilities of the Contractors with
each other and with those of the Construction Manager, the Owner and
the Architect to endeavor to manage the Project in accordance with the
latest approved estimate of Construction Cost, the Project Schedule and
the Contract Documents. [Presnell was also required to] coordinate the
2006-2007]
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the "contract provisions established that Presnell was to be in charge of
coordinating the sequence of construction."' 104 However, as the Kentucky
Supreme Court agreed, while the contractual duties owed to Delor were
representative of Presnell's obligations under the contract, "Presnell's duty
to EH [did] not rest on these contractual duties." ' Furthermore, "it [did]
not rest on any professional duty, but [was] 'based on an independent duty
[created by section 552] to avoid misstatements intended to induce reli-
ance."' " 6 In other words, "Presnell [owed] a duty to EH to exercise reason-
able care or competence in its supervision, collection and distribution of
information and directions it provided to EH for guidance."'
0 7
c. Economic Loss Ru/e.-While not addressed by the majority, another
important component of Presnell is Justice Keller's concurring opinion, in
which he addressed the status of the economic loss rule in Kentucky.'0 8 Al-
though neither party raised the economic loss rule in its arguments, Justice
Keller stated, "the rule is clearly implicated, if not inexorably intertwined,
with the legal arguments presented and authorities relied upon by the par-
ties."'1' Justice Keller agreed with the majority's opinion but opined that
the economic loss rule should also bar EH's common law negligence claim
for negligent supervision. While noting that no Kentucky court had explic-
itly referred to the economic loss rule by name, he stated that "Kentucky
appellate courts have implicitly applied [it] in the past""0 and urged that
sequence of construction and assignment of space in areas where the
Contractors are performing Work ... [and] schedule and coordinate the
sequence of construction in accordance with the Contract Documents
and the latest approved Project construction schedule.
Id. at *12-13.
1o4 Id.
105 Id. at* 13.
IO6 Id. (quoting Safeway Managing General Agency, Inc. v. Clark & Gamble, 985 S.W.2d
166, 169 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998)) (emphasis added).
107 Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court disagreed with this statement in one very impor-
tant way: the duty owed by a design professional to a third party under section 552 does not
encompass supervision of the project. Supra note 89 and accompanying text. However, this
may be a meaningless distinction. By alleging that the design professional supplied false in-
formation for the contractor's guidance in exercising his duties to supervise construction of the
project, a claim that is in substance one for negligent supervision may fit within the contours
of negligent misrepresentation.
io8 Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., L.L.C., 134 S.W.3d 575, 583 (Ky. 2004)
(Keller, J., concurring). Justice Graves joined in this concurring opinion.
io9 Id. at 585. This was attributed to the fact that "no Kentucky appellate decision has
ever used the specific phrase, 'economic loss rule' much less indicated its approval or adoption
of the rule." Id. at 585-86 (citing Yocum & Holliss, supra note z8, at 467). However, Justice
Keller noted that both the Kentucky Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals "have applied
the rule's principles without identifying their source." Id. at 586.
i in Id. at 583. For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the economic loss rule
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the "Court should expressly adopt the economic loss rule in order to en-
courage contracting parties to allocate . . . risks [for economic loss] them-
selves."1' 1 Justice Keller summarized his position by stating:
I agree with the economic loss rule's underlying rationale-i.e., the need
to establish a boundary between contract law and tort law so that 'parties
to a contract may allocate their risks by agreement and [will] not need the
special provisions of tort law to recover for damages caused by breach of
contract.' Accordingly, I would hold the economic loss rule is applicable to
Kentucky tort claims."
1 2
In articulating the proper formulation of the economic loss rule, Justice
Keller urged the adoption of the rule as stated by the Colorado Supreme
Court in Town of Alma v. AZCO Construction, Inc.
11 3
In Town of Alma, the city ("Alma") contracted with the construction
company ("AZCO") to construct improvements to its water distribution
system. After construction was complete, Alma discovered leaks in the sys-
tem and sued AZCO for breach of contract, negligence per se, negligence,
and breach of the implied warranty of sound workmanship. " 4 The trial
court granted AZCO's motion to dismiss the negligence and breach of the
implied warranty of sound workmanship claims. Relying on the economic
loss rule, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's findings and stat-
ed, "to hold otherwise would permit the non-breaching party to avoid the
contractual limitations of remedy.""' On appeal, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that "a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of an
express or implied contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a
breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law."'
116
in Kentucky, see Yocum & Hollis, supra note 28, at 459-71. The authors of this article, writ-
ten in response to the appellate court's ruling in Presnell, but prior to the ruling issued by the
Kentucky Supreme Court, argue that the adoption of section 552 "threatens the integrity of
contract law and the freedom to bargain far beyond the ambit of construction law." Id. at 473.
Thus, the authors favor a strict application of the economic loss rule in the context of com-
mercial transactions to bar claims solely for economic loss. In this context, the authors argue
that parties could have bargained for contractual provisions allowing them to seek compensa-
tion for economic damages from a non-privity participant in the project but failed to do so.
Thus, "what otherwise might have been used as a bargaining tool for either side becomes a
mandatory provision in all contracts between owners and construction managers" through the
creation of an independent duty under section 552. Id. at 472-73.
11i Presnell, 134 S.W.3d at 583 (Keller, J., concurring).
112 Id. at 589 (quoting 86 C.J.S. Torts § 26(a) (1997)).
113 Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., 1o P3d 1256 (Colo. 2000) (suit by owner against con-
tractor; claim for negligence barred by economic loss rule because contractor did not breach a
duty owed independent of its contract).
114 Id. at 1258.
115 Id. at 1258-59 (citation omitted).
i16 Id. at 1264.
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The Town of Alma court emphasized that the first step in applying the
economic loss rule is to focus on the source of the duty that the plaintiff
claims the defendant owed." 7 The court addressed the fundamental dis-
tinctions between the interests protected by contract and tort law and the
source of the duties created under each regime."' The court then reasoned
that the limitation of tort remedies in situations where the parties have
participated in the negotiation of a contract "serves to encourage parties to
confidently allocate risks during their bargaining without fear that unan-
ticipated liability may arise in the future, effectively negating the parties'
efforts to build these costs considerations into the contract. The economic
loss rule thus serves to ensure predictability in commercial transactions." 119
Therefore, the first step in determining the "availability of a contract or
tort action lies in determining the source of duty that forms the basis of the
action."1 0 Reinforcing this conclusion, the court referenced a discussion of
this issue by the South Carolina Supreme Court:
The question, thus, is not whether the damages are physical or economic.
Rather the question ofwhether the plaintiff may maintain an action in tort
for purely economic loss turns on the determination of the source of the duty
[the] plaintiff claims the defendant owed. A breach of a duty which arises
under the provisions of a contract between the parties must be redressed
under contract, and a tort action will not lie. A breach of duty arising inde-
pendently of any contract duties between the parties, however, may support
a tort action.
121
Applying the rule to the facts of the case, the Colorado Supreme Court
found that AZCO's contract with Alma explicitly defined AZCO's duty of
care.' Thus, AZCO did not owe an independent duty to Alma outside of
117 "The key to determining the availability of a contract or tort action lies in determin-
ing the source of the duty that forms the basis of the action." Id. at 1262.
118 "The essential difference between a tort obligation and a contract obligation is the
source of the duties of the parties." Id. Tort duties are normally imposed by law "to protect all
citizens from the risk of physical harm to their persons or to their property[, ... without regard
to any agreement or contract... [while] contractual duties arise from promises made between
parties." Id. "Contract law is intended to enforce the expectancy interests created by the par-
ties' promises so that they can allocate risks and costs during their bargaining." Id.
I19 Id.
12o Id. (In note 8, the court states that a more accurate term for the economic loss rule
would be the independent duty rule.) Id. at 1262 n.8.
121 Id. at 1262 (quoting Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones
& Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995) (emphasis added)); see also Presnell Constr.
Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., L.L.C., 134 S.W.3d 575, 589 (Ky. 2004) (quoting the same pas-
sage).
122 Town of Alma, 10 P.3d at 1264. The Court examined the contractual provisions re-
lating to various guaranties provided by AZCO and found that the "contractual provisions
demonstrate that AZCO expressly assumed the duty to guarantee its quality of workmanship
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its contractual obligations. Furthermore, Alma sought recovery solely for
the "cost of repair and replacement of the water lines that were the subject
of the contract";2 3 this constitutes economic loss damages and must be
supported by an independent duty of care in order to support a claim for
negligence. Since such an independent duty was lacking, the court dis-
missed the negligence claim." 4
In summary, under the economic loss rule articulated in Town of Alma
and endorsed by Justice Keller, the firs- step in determining whether a
plaintiff may maintain an action for purely economic loss is to determine if
there is an independent duty arising outside of the provisions of the con-
tract, rather than classifying the damages sought as either physical or eco-
nomic. Therefore, even under this view of the economic loss rule, the tort
of negligent misrepresentation is an exception and is not barred' because
it establishes a duty that is not seeded in the parties' contractual obliga-
tions. However, this version of the rule would bar common law negligence
claims, such as claims for negligent supervision.
IV. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? How WILL PRESNELL APPLY IN THE
CONTEXT OF CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION?
A. Why Would a Contractor Elect to Sue in Tort?
Fundamentally, one might wonder why a third-party contractor would elect
to sue a design professional in tort, rather than assert a breach of contract
claim against the owner with whom he or she has a contract.2 6 Practically
speaking, there are numerous reasons why it may be in the best interest of
the contractor to pursue such a course of action:
(1) The contracting partner may be insolvent.
(2) The injured party may wish to preserve good relations with its partner,
relations that would be soured by litigation.
and its materials when it undertook to install the water system." Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Presnell, 134 S.W.3d at 590 ("With this Court's adoption today of... § 552, we have
created an independent tort action of negligent misrepresentation, which is not barred by the
economic loss rule.")-
126 See, e.g., United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (i918) (landmark case establishing the
"Spearin Doctrine," which stands for the proposition that the owner impliedly warrants that
the information, plans, and specifications supplied to the contractor are accurate and suitable
for their intended use); see also Matthew J. Steffey, Negligence, Contract and Archiects' Liability
for Economic Loss, 82 Ky. L.J. 659, 682-83 (1994) (discussing the contractor's contractual rem-
edies against the owner for deficient plans and specifications).
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(3) The injured party and the contracting partner may settle the dispute for
an amount that is less than the extent of its entire loss.
(4) The action against the contracting partner may be limited in amount or
barred altogether, either by a provision in the contract or by the operation
of a rule of law.'
27
Whatever the rationale, the reality of the modern environment in con-
struction litigation is that contractors almost routinely assert negligence
claims against design professionals and courts are willing to entertain a tort
claim for economic loss in the form of negligent misrepresentation as op-
posed to general negligence.
B. Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation generally comes in one of two forms: intentional or neg-
ligent. Most jurisdictions adhere to the view that intentional misrepresen-
tation will give rise to a claim for damages solely in the form of economic
loss.",8 However, this cause of action is much more restrictive than negli-
gent misrepresentation due to its focus on the element of intent, which re-
quires that the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff through a false
representation. 129
127 FEINMAN,supra note 27, at 559; see also supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
128 See Barton, supra note 34, at 1802-12 (stating that the majority of jurisdictions recog-
nize that intentional misrepresentation (fraud) is an exception to the economic loss rule).
129
"Negligent misrepresentation" is a lesser included claim of fraudulent
misrepresentation, and it differs from fraudulent misrepresentation only
in that, while the latter requires knowledge that the pertinent statement
was false, the former merely requires that the person who made the
statement failed to exercise reasonable care or competence to obtain or
communicate true information.
37 Am. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 128 (2005) (quoting Fleming Cos. v. GAB Bus. Servs., 103
F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 (D. Kan. 2000)); see also William L. Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third
Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231, 233 (1966) ("The intent involved is intent to mislead (referring
to intentional misrepresentation), to deceive; and it requires something in the way of knowl-
edge or belief that what is misrepresented is in fact false .... "). In Kentucky, intentional
misrepresentation is referred to as fraudulent misrepresentation (also referred to as fraud or
deceit) and requires that the defendant (i) made a material representation, (2) which is false,
(3) which was known to be false or made recklessly, (4) which was made with the inducement
to be acted upon, (5) which the plaintiffacted in reliance upon, (6) which has caused the plain-
tiffinjury. Harman v. Sullivan Univ., No. o3-738-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 0904, at * 12 (W.D.
Ky. June 6,2005) (citing Rivermont Inn v. Bass Hotels & Resorts, 113 S.W.3d 636,640 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2003)); see also Sanford Constr. Co. v. S & H Contractors, 443 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1969) (fraud
claim asserted by subcontractor against contractor for misrepresentations made as to amount
and character of earthwork required on grading project). A fraudulent misrepresentation oc-
curs by either an intentional assertion of false information or a willful failure to disclose the
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Negligent misrepresentation, as applied in the context of construction
litigation, traces its roots back to 1962 when the California 30 and Tennes-
see131 courts were among the first to allow a contractor to assert a claim
against a design professional absent privity. However, many states were
hesitant to expand liability for economic loss and continued to adhere to
the application of the economic loss rule to bar claims for negligent misrep-
resentation. 32 Even in states that recognize negligent misrepresentation as
an exception to the economic loss rule, some courts have refused to extend
this cause of action to sophisticated participants in a construction project,
reasoning that such individuals should be able to contractually prescribe
their limits of liability for economic damages to third parties. 33 Nonethe-
truth. Id. (citing United Parcel Serv. v. Rickert, 996 S.W.zd 464, 469 (Ky. 1999)).
130 M. Miller Co. v. Dames & Moore, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961). In M. Miller
Co., a contractor asserted a negligence claim against a non-privity engineer for conducting soil
tests in a negligent manner. Id. at 14. Allegedly, the soil report failed to disclose unstable
material underlying a construction site which resulted in the plaintiff submitting a lower bid
than it would have had the conditions been represented accurately. Id. at 14. The court
noted "that a third party not in privity with the defendant could still recover damages for
the defendant's negligent performance of a contract where the circumstances were such that
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff and the injury to the plaintiff was foresee-
able." Id. at 15 (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958)). While the claim sounded in
misrepresentation, the court actually analyzed it as a general negligence claim and applied a
balance of factors test to determine that the engineer should be liable to the contractor. The
court stated:
[Tihe determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be
held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and in-
volves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to
which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foresee-
ability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury, and the policy of preventing future harm.
Id. at 15 (citing Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685,687 (Cal. 196i)).
131 Tex. Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 2o4 E Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 329 E2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964). In Texas Tunneling, a contractor sought to
recover damages for misrepresentations made by an engineer in the form of geologic reports
included as part of the documents distributed for use by prospective bidders. The court
ruled that the contractor could pursue a negligent misrepresentation claim despite the lack of
privity because the engineer owed an independent duty to "the class of persons [i.e. poten-
tial bidders] whose reliance upon and injury by the misrepresentations [could] reasonably be
foreseen." Id. at 835. On appeal, the district court's approval of the negligent misrepresen-
tation action was rejected, but nevertheless the "opinion became regarded as an important
precedent for the misrepresentation action." FEINMAN, supra note 27, at 47 n.44.
132 See supra note 29.
133 See Flow Indus. v. Fields Constr. Co., 683 F Supp. 527, 530 (D. Md. 1988) (reject-
ing negligent misrepresentation claim by general contractor against supplier to subcontractor
stating that "where ... the controversy concerns purely economic losses allegedly caused by
statements made during the course of a contractual relationship between businessmen, it is
plainly contract law which should provide the rules and principles by which the case is to be
2006-2007]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
less, it appears that in the context of construction disputes, the economic
loss rule is on the way out, and courts are increasingly willing to recognize
an exception for negligent misrepresentation. 1'-
Numerous courts around the country recognize that a third party may
bring an action seeking recovery solely for economic loss against a design
professional despite the lack of privity.13 s However, jurisdictions vary in
governed."); Universal Contracting Corp. v. Aug, No. C-o3o719, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 6661,
at *17 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2004) ("Where the parties are sophisticated business entities
that have contracted to protect against potential economic loss, contract principles override
the tort principles embodied in Section 552, and economic damages are not recoverable ex-
cept as provided in the contract or by the rules of contract interpretation.").
134 See Meagher & O'Day, supra note 13, at 27-28 (stating that a "growing number of
courts" are increasingly willing to discard the economic loss rule and "permit negligence ac-
tions by contractors or subcontractors against design professionals" due to the level of con-
trol that design professionals possess during the construction process). But see STEVEN M.
SIEGFRIED, 2-5A CONSTRUCTION LAW § 5A.07 (Matthew Bender & Company 2006) (noting
that "[tihe majority of cases that have considered the issue have refused to permit tort claims
for solely economic loss against architects and engineers" but recognizing that many courts al-
low an exception for negligent misrepresentation). Courts that have been willing to recognize
an exception for negligent misrepresentation have likely been persuaded by the comments
provided by the drafters of the Restatement. Illustration 9, which has been cited with approv-
al by some courts, is illustrative of the application of section 552 in the construction context:
The City of A is about to ask for bids for work on a sewer tunnel. It
hires B Company, a firm of engineers, to make boring tests and provide a
report showing the rock and soil conditions to be encountered. It notifies
B Company that the report will be made available to bidders as a basis
for their bids and that it is expected to be used by the successful bidder
in doing the work. Without knowing the identity of any of the contrac-
tors bidding on the work, B Company negligently prepares and delivers
to the City an inaccurate report, containing false and misleading infor-
mation. On the basis of the report C makes a successful bid, and also on
the basis of the report D, a subcontractor, contracts with C to do a part
of the work. By reason of the inaccuracy of the report, C and D suffer
pecuniary loss in performing their contracts. B Company is subject to
liability to C and to D.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, illus. 9 (1977). For cases citing illustration
9 with approval, see, for example, Jim's Excavating Service v. HKM Associates, 878
P.2d 248, 255 (Mont. 1994); Bilt-Rite Construction v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d
270, 276 (Pa. 2005).
135 See, e.g., Gulf Contracting v. Bibb Co., 795 F.zd 980 (I ith Cir. 1986) (contractor versus
architect); Malta Constr. Co. v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 902
(N.D. Ga. 1988) (claim by contractor against engineer for deficient drawings and plans); Tex.
Tunneling Co., 204 F. Supp. 821 (claim by subcontractor against engineer for misrepresenta-
tion of geologic conditions); United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal.
1958); Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1984); Carroll-
Boone Water Dist. v. M & P Equip. Co., 66s S.W.zd 345 (Ark. 1983); Donnelly Constr. Co. v.
Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984) (claim by contractor against architect); Bay
Garden Manor Condo. Ass'n v. James D. Marks Assocs., 576 So. 2d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
i99I ) (claim by condominium association against engineering firm performing inspection of
building); Robert & Co. Assoc. v. Rhodes-Haverty P'ship, 300 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. 1983) (claim by
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how they attempt to define the relationship that must exist between the
parties to support a claim. Generally, courts take one of three approach-
es: (1) limited privity,1 36 (2) section 552,117 or (3) general foreseeability.'
3 s
Predictably, courts and commentators disagree on the most favorable ap-
proach. 39 Kentucky has clearly adopted the standards for negligent mis-
prospective home purchaser against engineer conducting home inspection); S.E. Consultants
v. O'Pry, 404 S.E.2d 299 (Ga. Ct. App. 199) (claim by subsequent purchaser of home against
engineer conducting percolation tests on lot); Normoyle-Berg & Assocs. v. Vill. of Deer Creek,
350 N.E.2d 559 (11. App. Ct. 1976); Gurtler, Hebert & Co. v. Weyland Mach. Shop, Inc., 405
So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Milton Co. v. Council of Unit Owners of Bentley Place Condo.,
708 A.2d 1047 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998), aff'd, 729 A.zd 981 (Md. 1999); Prichard Bros. v.
Grady Co., 428 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 1988); Jim's Excavating Serv., 878 P.zd at 252-55; Conforti
& Eisele, Inc. v. John C. Morris Assocs., 418 A.2d 1290 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 198o), aff'd,
489 A.2d 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Pompano Masonry Corp. v. HDR Architecture,
Inc., 598 S.E.2d 6o8, 61z (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc., 866 A.zd 270 (claim
by contractor against architect for defective specifications); Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85 (S.C. 1995); Mid-Western Elec. v.
DeWild Grant Reckert & Assocs., 5oo N.W.zd 250, 254 (S.D. 1993); John Martin Co. v. Morsel
Diesel, Inc., 8 19 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1991) (claim by contractor against construction manager);
E. Steel Constructors, Inc. v. City of Salem, 549 S.E.2d z66 (W. Va. zoo ) (no privity of contract
required to recover economic loss); Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.zd 576 (W. Va. zooo).
136 This approach requires that the information provider and the plaintiff be in privity
or in a privity-like relationship. See, e.g., Essex v. Ryan, 446 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)
(claim by subsequent purchaser of property not allowed against surveyor where purchaser was
stranger to original contract); Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y.
1989) (cause of action for negligent misrepresentation allowed by owner against engineer
where there is a limited privity relationship); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 147 N.E. 441 (N.Y.
193 1) (recovery for negligent misrepresentation only allowed where there is priviy or a priv-
ity-like relationship between plaintiff and information provider).
137 See, e.g., Tex. Tunneling Co., 204 F. Supp. 8z (claim by subcontractor against engineer
for misrepresentation of geologic conditions); Bilt-Rite Contractors., Inc., 866 A.2d 270 (claim
by contractor against architect for defective specifications); John Martin Co., 819 S.W.2d 428
(claim by contractor against construction manager).
138 This approach applies a traditional tort analysis focusing on foresecability, which
"holds that a professional is liable for a merely negligent misrepresentation to any foreseeable
person who relies on the misrepresentation and, thereby, suffers economic injury." Martin,
supra note 28, at 668; see, e.g., Bacco Constr. Co. v. Am. Colloid Co., 384 N.W.2d 427 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1986) (engineer liable to contractor because it was foreseeable that engineer's miscalcu-
lations would cause harm to contractor); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983)
(accountants who prepared audit owed duty to all those they reasonably foresaw to be recipi-
ents of corporation's financial statements for proper business purposes), superseded by statute,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:5 3A-25 (West 2006), as recognized in E. Dickerson & Son, Inc. v. Ernst &
Young, LLP, 825 A.zd 585, 587 (N.J. Super Ct. 2003); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt
& Co., 335 N.W.zd 361 (Wis. 1983) (liability imposed on accountants for foreseeable injuries
resulting from negligent acts unless recovery denied on grounds of public policy).
139 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 28 (arguing for a retention of the limited privity require-
ment with categorical exceptions in cases involving negligent misrepresentations causing
economic loss); Prosser, supra note 129 (providing a general overview of approaches taken
by various courts addressing liability for both intentional and negligent misrepresentation);
Phillip Home, Note, Onita Pacific Corp. v. Trustees of Bronson: The Oregon Supreme Court
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representation set forth in section 552; therefore, further discussion will be
limited to this formulation of the rule and to cases in which other courts
have applied it in the context of construction litigation.
C. An In-Depth Look at the Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation
As stated previously, the Presnell decision offers very little in the way of
guidance regarding the critical elements of negligent misrepresentation.
Therefore, this section presents an analysis of its elements, points out criti-
cal areas of importance in construction litigation, and provides further in-
sight as to how section 552 may be applied in Kentucky.
1. Who is in the Business of Supplying Information?-The first element of sec-
tion 552 requires that the defendant be in the business of supplying infor-
mation for the guidance of others. 14° Additionally, the information provided
must be false, and the information provider must have a pecuniary interest
in the transaction. 141 In Presnell, the defendant was acting in the capacity
of a construction manager and was presumably responsible for providing
truthful information to the contractor for his guidance in carrying out his
responsibilities under his contract with the owner. Logically, this same
argument can be extended (and has been extended by other courts) to the
more typical role of a design professional participating in a construction
project. 142
Generally, courts have had little trouble reaching the conclusion that a
design professional is in the business of supplying information.143 In fact, in
the majority of cases, the court spends little time, if any, analyzing this ele-
ment of the cause of action. This is a logical conclusion because there are
Recognizes the Negligent Misrepresentation Tort, 72 OR. L. REV. 753, 756-62 (providing a history
of the development of the negligent misrepresentation action and varying positions taken by
state courts).
140
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is sub-
ject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reli-
ance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or compe-
tence in obtaining or communicating the information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(0) (1977) (Emphasis added).
141 This requirement would be satisfied in the case of a design professional receiving a
fee for his services. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. d (1977) ("The fact that
the information is given in the course of the defendant's business, profession or employment
is a sufficient indication that he has a pecuniary interest in it ... .
142 See supra note 135.
143 See FEINMAN, supra note 27, at 587-88 ("The initial element [business of supplying
information] of the § 552 standard for liability ... is obviously met in the case of architects
and engineers.").
[Vol. 95
CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES
numerous tasks performed by the design professional on a typical project
that support the conclusion that he or she is in the business of supplying
information.
A design professional is typically responsible for the preparation of
plans and specifications (information) that are supplied to and used by po-
tential bidders in formulating a bid for a project.1 44 Additionally, a design
professional may make representations to the contractor while perform-
ing administrative responsibilities, which are assumed as part of his or her
contract with the owner. 145 A specialty consultant, such as a geotechnical
engineer, may provide a report of subsurface conditions that the general
contractor or a subcontractor will use to determine quantities of excavation
required or to determine the type of equipment and the amount of time
required to remove materials.'4 Furthermore, an engineer could supply a
report, such as an evaluation of the integrity of a structure or an environ-
mental assessment of a parcel of land, to a prospective purchaser. 147 In each
of these instances, it is quite clear that the design professional is supplying
information in his or her professional capacity, as part of his or her business,
for the guidance of others in a business transaction. Furthermore, a design
professional's negligent misrepresentation could injure a third party in a
variety of ways.' 48  Thus, most courts conclude that the requirements of
section 552(1) are met under these circumstances.
144 See, e.g., Farrell Constr. Co. v. Jefferson Parish, 693 E Supp. 490 , 492 (E.D. La. 1988)
(An architect is under a duty to "exercise the degree of professional care and skill customarily
employed by other architects in preparing plans and specifications.").
145 See, e.g., John Martin Co. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. i99i) (holding
that a subcontractor, despite lack of privity, may assert a negligent misrepresentation claim
against a construction manager, whether the negligence is in the form of negligent direction
or supervision).
146 See, e.g., Tex. Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn.
1962) (claim by subcontractor against engineer for misrepresentation of geologic conditions),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964); M. Miller Co. v. Dames & Moore,
18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h, illus. 9
(1977).
147 See, e.g., Bay Garden Manor Condo. Ass'n v. James D. Marks Assocs., 576 So. 2d 744
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (exception to the economic loss doctrine where engineering firm
provided technical information upon which the owners relied).
148 FEINMAN, supra note 27, at 586. The author states that a design professional's negli-
gent misrepresentation may harm a contractor in one of three general ways.
In jobs put out to bid, the architect or engineer often assists in the
preparation of the bid documents. If a statement about the condition
of the site in the bid documents is erroneous, the builder is likely to
incur additional and unexpected costs ofperformance. Similarly, if the plans,
drawings, or specifications of the contract are imprecise or incorrect, the
contractor may suffer delay and greater expense in completing its performance
satisfactorily. Finally, during performance the architect or engineer may
improperly advise the owner as to whether a contractor has complied with
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Surprisingly, a minority of jurisdictions have ruled that in some instanc-
es a design professional is not supplying "information" when providing
plans and specifications for use during construction.149 One commentator
stated that it is "true the contractor follows the plans and specifications, but
that of itself does not make a design professional a person in the business
of providing information."1 0 Supporters of this position argue that "in-
formation contained in the plans and specifications is the depictive work
product mandating a result, not a product which the person is supposed to
interpret for his or her own purposes."'' s Thus, the plans and specifications
are viewed as a component of the end product rather than "information."
While it is true that a design professional does not supply information in
the same context as other service professionals, such as an accountant or an
attorney, a conclusion that they are not in the business of supplying infor-
mation is without merit. The design professional is paid a fee for using his
or her skills and training to provide information that is relied on by others
prior to and during construction. Accordingly, just as the businessperson
relies on information provided by an accountant in purchasing a prospec-
tive business, a contractor relies on plans and specifications prepared by a
design professional in crafting a bid for the construction of a structure. If
the plans and specifications prove to be erroneous, the contractor is at grave
risk of suffering economic loss.
In reality, the jurisdictions that have ruled that a design professional is
not in the business of supplying information are simply expressing their
disfavor for recognizing a claim in tort for economic loss in alternate form
and use this theory as a way to further limit construction project partici-
pants' liability for economic damages. Arguably, a strict application of the
economic loss rule 5 ' or adhering to a privity or near privity standard
5 3
achieves the same result. In any event, this represents a minority view,
and in states recognizing section 552, the majority of courts find that design
the terms of the contract, either in completing its performance according
to standard or in requesting a change, as a result of which the contractor
may not receive payment or may have to do additional work.
Id. at 586-87 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
149 See, e.g., Tolan & Son v. KLLM Architects, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 288, 296-3oo (I11. App.
Ct. 1999) (engineer or architect not in the business of supplying information for the use of
others because the information was ancillary to the production of a tangible product such as
a building).
150 STEVEN M. SIEGFRIED, 2-5A CONSTRUCTION LAW § 5A.o6 4 (2006).
151 Id.
152 See, e.g., BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66 (Colo. 2004) (denying negligent
misrepresentation claim by subcontractor against design professional based on the economic
loss rule).
153 See, e.g., Vill. of Cross Keys, Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 556 A.2d I126, 1131-32 (Md.
1989) (whether a duty exists in negligence and negligent misrepresentation cases depends on
whether there is an intimate nexus between parties).
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professionals are in the business of supplying information for the guidance
of others.
2. Foreseeability of the Plaintiff andJustifiable Reliance.-The second element
of section 552 focuses on the foreseeability of the plaintiff and the plain-
tiff's reliance'54 on the information provided. Section 552(2) states that:
[T]he liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient
intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the informa-
tion to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially
similar transaction. 
155
a. Foreseeable Plaintiff.-In a typical construction project, the design
professional usually provides information to the owner. The owner passes
the information on to contractors for their use in the preparation of bids
and for guidance during construction of the project. Courts allowing re-
covery for negligent misrepresentation rarely have trouble finding that a
contractor is a foreseeable plaintiff and is a member of the "limited group
of persons for whose benefit and guidance"1 6 the design professional pro-
vides information 7 As the comments to section 552 indicate, the identity
of the individual to whom the information is eventually supplied does not
have to be known at the time the negligent misrepresentation is made; it
is sufficient that the individual is a member of the limited group of persons
to whom the owner intends to supply the information.1 5 1 Therefore, the
foreseeability requirements of section 552 will normally be satisfied, even
though a specific contractor is usually not identified at the time a design
professional provides information.
At some point, the plaintiff's connection with the design professional
will become too remote and a court might rule that the plaintiff is not a
154 The plaintiff's reliance must also be justified. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
552(l) (1977).
155 Id. § 552(2).
156 Id.
157 See, e.g., Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 287 (Pa.
2005) (The imposition of a duty on an architect pursuant to section 552 is consistent with
traditional notions of tort duty because "the professional is well aware that the design will be
provided to and utilized by others in their own business dealings.").
I58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h (977) ("[lit is not required that the
person who is to become the plaintiff be identified or known to the defendant as an individual
when the information is supplied.").
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member of the foreseeable group of individuals for whom the informa-
tion was supplied. For instance, the typical construction project involves
extensive networks of subcontracts for other items of work, contracts with
material suppliers, and relationships with surety companies who undertake
an obligation to assume a contractor's responsibilities in the event of de-
fault. A negligent misrepresentation made by a design professional could
potentially harm all of these individuals. Thus, a critical question is at what
point along this relationship continuum the liability of the design profes-
sional will terminate.
One of the central criticisms of imposing tort liability for economic loss
is that defendants are exposed to liability "in an indeterminate amount for
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."'' 9 The requirements of
section 552(1) present a solution by limiting potential plaintiffs to a foresee-
able class. At what point along this continuum the line will be drawn varies
based on the facts of the case. In general, a contractor or subcontractor
60
is a member of this foreseeable group of persons. However, other entities,
such as surety companies and material suppliers, present a much more at-
tenuated connection to the design professional; it is unlikely that the ma-
jority of courts would hold a design professional liable to these groups.161
b. Justifiable Reliance.-Another requirement of section 552 is that the
plaintiff be justified in relying on the information supplied by the design
professional. ' 6  This element provides the design professional with the
best opportunity to mount a solid defense against a claim for negligent mis-
representation. Additionally, a court must evaluate this component in light
of the language of the contracts existing between the parties and any dis-
claimers that might be included within plans and specifications provided
to the contractor.
The following example illustrates the application of this component in
a typical construction project. Assume that the owner retains company X,
159 Ultamares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931);seealso supra notes 56-57
and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., Boren v. Thompson & Assocs., 999 P.2d 438 (Okla. 2000) (architect owes duty
to subcontractor not to negligently certify payments to contractor); Seattle W. Indus. v. David
A. Mowat Co., 750 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1988) (claim by subcontractor against architect).
16I Compare Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pavia-Byrne Eng'g Corp., 393 So. 2d 83
o , 838 (La.
Ct. App. 1981) (engineer or architect owes same degree of care to surety as that owed to own-
er), with Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Wade-Trim/Assocs., Inc., No. 90-1948, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
244, at *8 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 1992) (refusing to impose duty on architect or engineer to surety
where contract established services were not for protection of surety).
162 Terwilliger, supra note 28, at 293-94 ("IThe foreseeability requirement [of negli-
gent misrepresentation] ... [requires that] the faulty information given on plans and specifica-
tions must be intended by its negligent supplier to be specifically relied upon by a particular
party or settled class of parties ... and this class [must] reasonably rely on the information
negligently supplied.").
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a geotechnical engineering firm, to design a foundation for a new building
and to provide a general assessment of the geological conditions present
on the site. X conducts a site investigation and provides a report to the
architect for use in designing the foundation of the structure and to a gen-
eral civil engineering firm for use in developing a site preparation plan. In
this report, X indicates that rock will be encountered at Elev. 100."3 Based
on this report, the civil engineer prepares a site excavation plan designed
to minimize the quantity of rock excavation required on the project and
reduce the owner's expenditures for site preparation. The architect also
uses this report to design the foundation for the building. Contractors re-
ceive a copy of X's report during the bidding process. However, a standard
disclaimer is included within the plans and specifications, stating that the
report is provided for information only and the contractor is not entitled to
rely on the report. 164 Thus, the contractor is required to perform his or her
own site investigation and draw his or her own conclusions as to the sub-
surface conditions. Despite the presence of the disclaimer, the contractor
relies on X's report and incurs economic loss when rock is encountered at
Elev. 110.165 Assuming that the report was prepared negligently, does the
contractor have a valid negligent misrepresentation claim against X?
This scenario highlights the importance of the justifiable reliance com-
ponent of section 552. If the report was supplied to the contractor for his
or her use in computing a bid without qualification, this scenario would
clearly fit within the confines of section 552. 66 X supplied information for
the contractor's guidance and the contractor relied upon the information
163 Elevation (Elev.) refers to the height of a fixed reference point above mean sea level
(or some other assumed datum). Set generally Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.orgwiki/
Elevation (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). In this hypothetical, Elev. ioo represents a height above
an assumed datum. For example, if the lowest point on this piece of property is assigned an
elevation of zero (point one), a point located at Elev. oo (point two) would be one hundred
feet higher than point one. This means that if rock is encountered at Elev. 9o , it is located ten
feet below the level predicted in the report. Conversely, if rock is encountered at Elev. 11o,
it is located ten feet above the location predicted in the report. When rock is encountered
at an elevation above that used for design and bidding purposes, construction costs typically
increase dramatically because more rock must be removed to prepare the site and construct
the building.
164 Disclaimers of the accuracy of geotechnical reports are routinely included when this
information is provided to contractors as part of a bid package. The inclusion of this condi-
tion alters the typical situation contemplated by the drafters of section 552, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 illus. 9 (I977), because the presence of the disclaimer indicates that
the information is not being provided to contractors for use in their bid. Kentucky has found
such disclaimers to be enforceable, subject to certain limitations. See Codell Constr. Co. v.
Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 16i, 164 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
165 Typically, delay and economic loss would result due to an increase in labor and equip-
ment costs. The contractor would be required to use more costly equipment for excavation.
In addition, the amount of time required to remove rock, as opposed to soil, during excavation
operations would be much longer.
166 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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in computing his or her bid. X failed to exercise reasonable care and com-
petence in obtaining or communicating the information. Due to the false
information provided in the report, the contractor suffered pecuniary loss
and would be entitled to assert a negligent misrepresentation claim against
X. However, because the plans included a disclaimer that places the con-
tractor on notice that he or she is not entitled to rely on the accuracy of the
report, the contractor's claim would fail because his or her reliance was not
justified. 67
Applying the justifiable reliance component of section 552 in this fash-
ion produces the proper result because it takes into account the expecta-
tions of the various parties at the time the contract is formed. 168 Many
167 See APAC-Carolina, Inc. v. Greensboro-High Point Airport Auth., 431 S.E.zd 508,
517-18 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). In APAC, the court upheld a summary judgment ruling in an
action involving a negligent misrepresentation claim by a contractor against an engineering
company. The contractor alleged that the engineering company "failed to properly prepare
plans, misrepresented the amount of necessary undercut work, and misled [the contractor]
into believing that such work would not be significant." Id. at 517. The court found that the
contractor's reliance on the amount of undercut (removal of unstable soil) work presented in
the plans was not justified. The contract included a clause which required that the bidder
"carefully examine the site of the proposed work, the proposal, plans, specifications, and con-
tract forms" in order to draw his own conclusions about the quantity of work to be performed.
Id. Furthermore, the clause stated, "[tihe submission of a proposal shall be prima facie evi-
dence that the bidder has made such examination and is satisfied as to the conditions to be
encountered in performing the work and as to the requirements of the proposed contract,
plans, and specifications." Id. at 518. The court concluded that the contractor's reliance was
not justified because "the plans and specifications discussed the potential undercut work,
the contact addressed undercut work... [and the contractor] did not fully inspect the avail-
able information, and the quantities stated in the contract were merely estimates." Id.; see
also Sanford Constr. Co. v. S & H Contractors, Inc., 443 S.W.zd 227 (Ky. 1969) (discussing
issues of reliance in the context of a fraudulent misrepresentation action involving a claim
by a subcontractor against a contractor stemming from alleged misrepresentations regarding
subsurface conditions at a construction site); Marcellus Constr. Co. v. Vill. of Broadalbin, 302
A.D.zd 640 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (upholding grant of summary judgment to engineer on neg-
ligent misrepresentation claim where no relationship tantamount to privity was present with
contractor and reliance on report of subsurface conditions not justified in light of instructions
advising bidders they were required to conduct their own investigation of site conditions);
David Pflumm Paving & Excavating, Inc. v. Found. Servs. Co., 816 A.2d 1164, 1170-71 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003) (economic loss rule bars claims solely for economic loss and distinguishing
the facts of the case from section 552 illustration 9 because bidders were specifically told not
to rely on report), abrogated by Bilt-Rite Contractors., Inc. v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d
270, 286 (Pa. zoo5) (economic loss rule does not bar negligent misrepresentation claim against
architect solely for economic loss).
168 "The contract" is used here to indicate all contracts used during the process. In this
example, when Xentered into a contract with the owner to provide geotechnical information,
he did so with the expectation that the information was prepared for design purposes only. It
was his "expectation" that the contractor would be forced to draw his own conclusions about
the site, and thus, he would not be liable for any economic loss incurred by the contractor in
reliance on the report. Additionally, the contractor received notice that he was not entitled to
rely on the report. Therefore, it was his "expectation" that he should proceed with caution in
formulating a bid for the project and take appropriate action to ensure that he was providing
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times, a design professional's motivation for performing specific tasks dur-
ing the preparation of plans and specifications conflicts with the manner
in which a contractor may use the information. Therefore, the information
provided is neither sufficient nor intended for the contractor's guidance
in that particular aspect of his or her business. Furthermore, it is unreal-
istic to expect a design professional to possess the same level of skill and
knowledge of the intricate details of the construction trade as a contractor.
Through the enforcement of limiting language included in contracts, plans,
and specifications, a court can produce a reasonable compromise between
those favoring imposition of tort liability and those proposing sole reliance
on contractual remedies. If the contractor is forced to draw his or her own
conclusions about certain aspects of the project, he or she can adjust the
bid accordingly to account for any additional risk. Alternatively, the con-
tractor can choose to conduct his or her own investigation, or hire his or
her own design professional to assess the project and provide the informa-
tion needed to create a reliable bid. 69 Thus, while privity is not required
for a contractor to assert a negligent misrepresentation claim against a de-
sign professional, the language included in the contract documents should
not be wholly discarded from the court's analysis when determining if the
plaintiff's reliance was justified. 170
In Mid States Steel Products Co. v. University of Kentucky, the Kentucky-
Court of Appeals addressed a somewhat similar factual scenario in the con-
text of a construction dispute. 7 ' A contractor had filed numerous claims
against a design professional, one of which was for negligent misrepresen-
tation based on allegedly negligent design drawings supplied during the
a realistic bid.
169 It is important to note that while this view is generally accepted, there may be some
situations in which the amount of time that the contractor may have to conduct such an inves-
tigation is unreasonable. Alternatively, the site of the project may be inaccessible during the
bidding process. In such situations, a court should consider the circumstances in determining
whether the contractor's reliance was justified despite the presence of a disclaimer included
within the plans. Otherwise, the express language of the contract would produce an absurd
and unreasonable result.
170 Some courts might also allow a similar challenge framed in the context of compara-
tive negligence on behalf of the relying party. See Mark A. Olthoff, If You Don't Know Where
You're Going, You'll End Up Somewhere Else: Applicability of Comparative Fault Princples in
Purely Economic Loss Cases, 49 DRAKE L. REv. 589, 615- 17 (2001). Kentucky adheres generally
to the doctrine of comparative negligence, although it has not issued a ruling on similar facts.
See Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984),superseded by statute, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41 1.182
(West 2oo6), as recognized in Baker v. Webb, 883 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).
171 Mid States Steel Products Co. v. Univ. of Ky., No. 2004-CA-oo1434-MR, 2oo6 WL
1195914, *1 (Ky. Ct. App. May 5,2oo6). Although the portion of the claim based on negligent
design drawings was dismissed, the contractor was able to maintain its negligent misrepre-
sentation claim on the basis of assurances made by the architect concerning when complete
drawings would be provided to the contractor. Id.
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bidding process.' The contractor acknowledged that it was aware of prob-
lems with the design drawings at the time it submitted its bid. Therefore,
the court determined that the contractor did not rely upon the information
at the time of its bid and dismissed the negligent misrepresentation claim
based on the supply of negligent design drawings.'73 Although this particu-
lar case is still wading its way through the appellate process, the decision
appears to offer a bit of comfort to design professionals. It provides one
concrete example of a way in which a design professional can use the reli-
ance component of section 552 as a defense to a negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim asserted by a contractor related to information supplied during
the bidding process.
3. What is the Standard of Care?-Based on the plain language of section
552, a duty is imposed upon the supplier of information to "exercise reason-
able care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information."
174
However, the question remains as to whether this is simply an ordinary
reasonable person standard or if it is based on a professional negligence
standard. 7 ' At least one court has stated that section 552 "imposes a simple
reasonable man standard upon the supplier of the information."' 76 How-
ever, other courts have framed the inquiry in the context of a professional
negligence standard.177 The comments offered by the drafters of section
552 seem to indicate that the standard of care should be established in light
of the particular business or the type of profession in which the informa-
172 The contractor submitted a bid for steel fabrication and erection on the project. Id.
at *i. Steel fabricators normally rely on design drawings in order to accurately fabricate steel
members in their shop that are later placed into the appropriate location within a structure.
Therefore, if design drawings are incomplete at the time of the bid, it is very difficult for
a fabricator to estimate accurately the cost of materials and labor required to complete the
project.
173 Id. at i i.
174 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977) (emphasis added).
175 "Generally, individuals 'performing architectural and engineering services are per-
forming professional services, and the law imposes upon such persons the duty to exercise a
reasonable degree of skill and care, as determined by the degree of skill and care ordinarily
employed by their respective professions under similar conditions and like surrounding cir-
cumstances."' Constance Frisby Fain, Architect and Engineer Liability, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 32, 35
(1995) (quoting Housing Auth. v. Greene, 383 S.E.2d 867 (Ga. 1989)).
176 Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 286 (Pa. 2005).
177 See Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 255 S.E.2d 580, 585 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1979) (While discussing the duty of an engineer in the context of negligent misrepresen-
tation, the court stated that "[an] engineer is required to exercise that degree of care which
a... engineer of ordinary skill and prudence would exercise under similar circumstances...
."); see also Roger W. Slone, Architects' and Engineers' Liability under Iowa Construction Law, 50
DRAKE L. REV. 33,49-50 (2001) (stating that when architects or engineers are acting in a capac-
ity in which they are supplying information to others "the tort of negligent misrepresentation
would still require the standard of the ordinary skill, care, and learning of members of the profession
in similar circumstances") (emphasis added).
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tion provider is engaged. 171 Thus, it would appear that the drafters would
advocate a professional negligence standard that would require expert tes-
timony to prove the information provider has failed to exercise reasonable
care in obtaining or communicating the information.
In cases involving professionals, Kentucky courts generally apply a rea-
sonable person standard where conduct is evaluated in light of the circum-
stances in the case. 179 If a design professional allegedly supplies false infor-
mation and fails to exercise reasonable care, it would seem that testimony
from a professional possessing the same skills and training as that of the
defendant would be required to determine if he has failed to comply with
the standard of care. 180 Otherwise, it would be difficult for the average juror
to apply his or her own experience in evaluating the defendant's behavior.
However, in Mid States Steel Products Co., the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals indicated that this cause of action does not require expert testimony
178 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, cmt. f. (1977).
The care and competence that the supplier of information for the
guidance of others is required under the rule stated in this Section to
exercise in order that the information given may be correct, must be
exercised in the following particulars. If the matter is one that requires
investigation, the supplier of the information must exercise reasonable care
and competence to ascertain the facts on which his statement is based. He
must exercise the competence reasonably expected of one in his business orpro-
fessionalposition in drawing inferences from facts not stated in the information.
He must exercise reasonable care and competence in communicating the in-
formation so that it may be understood by the recipient, since the proper
performance of the other two duties would be of no value if the informa-
tion accurately obtained was so communicated as to be misleading.
Id. (Emphasis added).
179 See DAVID J. LEIBSON, KENTUCKY PRACTICE SERIES TORT LAW § 1o.i6 (stating that
Kentucky cases adhere to a negligence standard of care "to act as the reasonable person 'un-
der like or similar circumstances"'). Arguably, this standard could lead to the conclusion that
expert testimony would be required in a case involving a professional accused of making a
negligent misrepresentation.
18o See Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.zd 652, 654-55 (Ky. 1992) (citing W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 39 (5th ed. 1984) (expert testimony generally required
in a medical malpractice case unless "any layman is competent to pass judgment and conclude
from common experience that such things do not happen if there has been proper skill and
care"-application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur)).
Some courts have found that expert testimony is not required in cases involving neg-
ligence claims against design professionals. Compare Jaeger v. Henningson, Durham &
Richardson, Inc., 714 Ezd 773, 775- 76 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying "common knowledge" excep-
tion and stating that no expert testimony required to find design professional negligent in
supervisory capacity, but expert testimony required to find design professional negligent in
preparing plans and specifications), with City of York v. Turner-Murphy Co., 452 S.E.2d 615,
616-18 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to adopt a bright line rule disposing of expert testimony
requirement in claims against design professionals for negligent supervision).
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to establish the applicable standard of care.'' In a separate portion of the
court's opinion discussing the statute of limitations that should apply to
negligent misrepresentation, the court held that a negligent misrepresen-
tation claim is one for ordinary negligence, not professional malpractice.,"
Thus, the court, apparently applying this same line of reasoning, concluded
that expert testimony is not required.
Upon a close reading, the court's result appears to be quite confusing.
The contractor had actually alleged two different misrepresentations to
support the negligent misrepresentation claim against the design profes-
sional: (1) supplying negligent design drawings, and (2) making assurances
as to when the contractor would receive complete design drawings.8 3 The
court dismissed part (1) of the claim because it found that the contractor
did not rely on the design drawings, but found that part (2) asserted a valid
claim for negligent misrepresentation.' A logical assumption is that had
the contractor been able to establish that he justifiably relied on the design
drawings, he would have made a valid claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion based on the allegations in part (1). However, in a later portion of the
opinion, the court indicated that part (1) was a professional malpractice
claim and part (2) was an ordinary negligence claim.""5 Therefore, based
on the court's reasoning, negligent misrepresentation is either an ordinary
or professional negligence claim, depending on the nature of the misrepre-
sentation made to the injured party.
Whether the court actually intended this result is an open question,
but it certainly seems to be a confusing interpretation of the law. A more
desirable approach would be to evaluate the design professional's conduct
in light of the standard of care within the profession and require expert
testimony in support of the claim. However, at this time Mid States Steel
I81 Mid States Steel Prods. Co. v. Univ. of Ky., No. 2oo4-CA-oo14 34 -MR, zoo6 WL
1195914, at *12 (Ky. Ct. App. May 5, 2oo6) (negligent misrepresentation claim is not pro-
fessional negligence claim; it is an ordinary negligence claim that does not require expert
testimony).
182 Id. at *12. The design professional argued that KRS § 413.245, which provides a
one year statute of limitations for professional negligence, should apply to this cause of ac-
tion. However, the court, citing to Safeway Managing GeneralAgency, Inc. v. Clark & Gamble, 985
S.W2d 166 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998), held that negligent misrepresentation is an ordinary negli-
gence claim, not one for professional malpractice. Thus, it declined to apply KRS § 413.245
and held that KRS § 413.120(7) provides the applicable statute of limitations. This statute
"provides a five-year limitations period for 'an action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff,
not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated."' MidStates, 2oo6 WL 1195914, at *12
(quoting Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.120(7) (West 2oo6)).
183 Id. at *ii.
184 Id.
185 Id. at *12. The court does not explain why it considered this to be a professional
malpractice claim, but presumably, it considered the fact that the allegation involved design
drawings, rather than assurances made to the contractor, to make this aspect of the claim one
for professional malpractice rather than ordinary negligence.
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Products Co. is the only guidance available under Kentucky law, and it ap-
pears that negligent misrepresentation is an ordinary negligence claim and
the use of expert testimony is not required.
4. Summary--Foretelling the Future After Presnell.-In summary, if one
thing is clear from Presnell it is that section 552 creates a duty, arising in-
dependently from any contractual obligations, upon design professionals
to exercise reasonable care in supplying information for the guidance of
other participants in the construction process. As referenced previously, a
design professional can fit within the confines of section 552 in a variety of
contexts in the performance of his or her duties on a typical project,186 and
the Presnell holding is not likely to be limited to the role of a construction
manager. In fact, subsequent to Presnell, state and federal courts in Ken-
tucky have issued opinions in cases involving a section 552 cause of action
that supports this conclusion. 187
Presnell also reinforces the position that privity is no longer a bar to a
tort action in the state of Kentucky, even if the alleged damages arise in
the context of a construction dispute where the parties are sophisticated
and engaged in a commercial transaction. 188 Furthermore, section 552
will allow a party who is not in privity with a design professional to bring
an action solely for economic loss when he or she has been damaged by
the design professional's failure to exercise reasonable care in supplying
information for his or her guidance in a business transaction. However, an
analysis of this cause of action cannot proceed in a vacuum that ignores the
contractual relations among the various parties and their position as sophis-
ticated entities engaged in a common enterprise. Thus, it is likely that the
courts will analyze a plaintiff's case in light of the contracts between the
parties to determine if the plaintiff's reliance on the information supplied
was justified.
186 Supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
187 See Forbes v. Cemex, No. I:o3CV67-R, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15322, at *11-15 (W.D.
Ky. July 28, 2005) (plaintiff failed to establish that employer made negligent misrepresenta-
tion regarding the status of life insurance following termination of an employee; health insur-
ance notices contained no statements regarding life insurance); Harman v. Sullivan Univ. Sys.,
No. o3-738-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS io9o4, at *19 (W.D. Ky. June 6,2005) (student presented
sufficient evidence to create material issue of fact as to whether university negligently misrep-
resented that she could take a national certification examination upon graduation); MidStates
SteelProds. Co., 2006 WL 1195914, at *12 (contractor may assert negligent misrepresentation
claim against architect); Crown Mortgage Co. v. Decarlo, No. 1999-CA-oo2928-MR, 2004 WL
2315049, at * i (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (plaintiff attempted to hold insurance agent liable
for negligent misrepresentation).
188 Supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
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D. What Effect lill Presnell Have on the Status
of the Economic Loss Rule in Kentucky?
As previously discussed, Justice Keller urged Kentucky courts to formally
adopt the economic loss rule and provided a preferred formulation of the
rule. 89 Even under this formulation, however, negligent misrepresentation
is an exception to its sweeping bar of tort actions for economic loss. 19° In
the context of construction litigation, this leads to the conclusion that gen-
eral negligence claims are barred.' 9' However, this adds little in the context
of construction disputes because the principle applied by the majority in
Presnell produces the same result.'
92
At least one court has opined that Kentucky is not ready to adopt the
formulation of the economic loss rule suggested by Justice Keller. In Louis-
ville Gas & Electric Co. v. Continental Field Systems, 93 the plaintiff ("LG&E")
sought damages from two contractors resulting from a broken fan shaft
placed on an electrical generating unit.194 The allegations contained a neg-
ligence claim against each of the contractors for failure to exercise ordi-
nary care in performing their work. The contractors sought to have the
negligence counts dismissed "on the grounds that the economic loss rule
bars any claim for economic damages and negligence that actually arises
from breach of contract."' 95 "All parties seemfed] to acknowledge that [the
contractors] were providing a service to LG&E, rather than selling a prod-
uct.'' 16 The district court acknowledged that the economic loss rule serves
to preserve the distinction between contract and tort and that Kentucky
courts would apply it in the appropriate circumstances. However, the court
was unwilling to expand the application of the rule beyond the context of
economic loss resulting from damage to a product to encompass economic
damages arising from the provision of services.
189 Supra notes 108-25 and accompanying text.
19o Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., L.L.C., 134 S.W.3d 575,583 (Ky. 2004)
(Keller, J. concurring) (agreeing with the result reached by the majority that negligent misrep-
resentation is an exception to the application of the economic loss rule).
191 For instance, if a party not in privity sought to assert a professional negligence claim
against a design professional, the economic loss rule would bar the claim unless it stemmed
from damage to person or property.
192 Supra note 94 and accompanying text.
193 Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Continental Field Sys., No. 3:oiCV-3 8 7 -H, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7634 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 17, 2005).
194 The two contractors were Continental Field Systems, who was under contract with
LG&E to provide maintenance and repair services, and Advanced Welding Systems, who had
no contractual relationship with LG&E but was providing services at Continental's request.
Id. at *3.
195 Id. at * i
196 Id.
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This Court's previous discussion of the economic loss rule has assumed
that its application is limited to circumstances involving the sale and provi-
sion of products .... Defendants rely heavily upon the concurring opinion
of two justices in Presnell... However, that concurring opinion is not per-
suasive evidence that Kentucky courts will apply the economic loss rule to
services. Presnell and EH are similarly situated to LG&E and Advanced
Welding in that neither pair were in privity nor maintained a contractual
relationship. Consequently, the economic loss rule, which bars tort claims
among those in a contractual relationship for the sale of goods, by definition
could not apply. Concurring opinion neither considered nor analyzed the
difficulties of applying the rule to circumstances beyond the sale of goods.
Moreover, the Court's majority decided the case without any reference to
the economic loss rule.
This Court believes that it is on sound ground in predicting that Ken-
tucky courts would apply the economic loss rule in its classic definition.
However, it would be pure speculation to suggest that Kentucky courts
would adopt the broader application of the rule discussed in the Presnell
concurrence. 197
If this court's reception of Justice Keller's concurring opinion is rep-
resentative, then it will have little effect on the landscape of litigation in
Kentucky. Arguably, in the field of construction litigation, this is the proper
result. Nevertheless, defendants facing a claim solely for economic loss
will predictably continue to reach out and attempt to expand the economic
loss rule beyond the context of products liability.
V CONCLUSION
It is clear that in cases involving a claim by a third party against a design
professional, counsel is wise to couch a claim in terms of negligent mis-
representation to avoid potential defenses. Presne/l clearly establishes that
neither the economic loss rule nor the absence of privity will bar claims for
negligent misrepresentation in Kentucky. However, there is little consis-
tency on this issue in jurisdictions across the country and it is imperative
that counsel determine the law of the jurisdiction prior to drafting a com-
plaint.
From a policy perspective, Kentucky has adopted a rule that achieves a
compromise between the debate over strict adherence to contract remedies
and broad imposition of tort liability. Section 552 contains important limi-
tations on the class of plaintiffs who may bring a cause of action, ensuring
that the imposition of liability for negligent misrepresentation will not lead
197 Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted).
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to a flood of new litigation. 9 The imposition of tort liability for a design
professional's negligent misrepresentation also provides an incentive for
the design professional to adhere to the proper standard of care, thus serv-
ing the goal of producing a quality project for the owner. Furthermore, it
certainly seems just to impose liability upon the design professional when
a contractor, placed in a position of reliance by necessity, incurs economic
loss due to the design professional's negligence.
Presnell will also have an impact on the conduct of participants in the
construction industry outside of the courtroom. Parties are likely to devel-
op new forms of contractual terms in an effort to avoid the consequences
of tort liability for negligent misrepresentation. In addition, the use of dis-
claimers may become more prevalent as a means of placing the contractor
on notice that he or she is not entitled to rely on certain portions of the
design information. Predictably, insurance companies will soon take notice
of Kentucky's willingness to impose liability for economic loss on design
professionals, and an increase in malpractice liability insurance rates may
ensue. Conversely, as the particulars of the elements of the cause of action
develop in the courts, contractors may be able to reduce some of the con-
tingency costs included in their bids to offset unforeseen risks involved in
the project. In addition, design professionals may become more attuned to
the construction process, and projects may proceed in a more cooperative
environment where the parties are more interested in achieving a com-
promise that is in the best interests of the project rather than focusing on
cynical projections of another party's motives.
198 Supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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